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CHARTED TERRITORY: THE LOUISIANA
EXPERIENCE WITH THE UNIFORM CHILD
CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
Lucy S. McGough* and Anne R. Hughes**
Forum contests in child custody cases impose enormous costs upon
the legal system and upon the families who wage the battles. For
over a century, legal scholars have agreed that the power of state
courts to resolve interstate custody disputes ought not to be deter-
mined according to generally applicable in rem or in personam rules;1
just what other rules ought to replace the ancient territorial tests,
however, remains obscure. Only very recently has any consensus about
custody-specific jurisdictional principles begun to emerge. In 1968, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for-
mulated these principles in its model statute, the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).2 Although the UCCJA is complex
and arguably flawed by an overabundance of trial court discretion,
it clearly represents an advance over the doctrinal chaos which ex-
isted prior to its promulgation?
In 1978, the Louisiana legislature adopted the UCCJA which is
now in force in all states except Texas and Massachusetts Since 1978,
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The author wishes to express
appreciation to the Kellogg National Fellowship Program for having made possible
her work on child custody dispute resolution of which this research is but a part.
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1. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877), Justice Field first suggested
that there was a category of "status" adjudications, which included at least marriage
and divorce actions, which ought to be exempted from otherwise constitutionally bind-
ing due process restraints upon state court jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
See also Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Reason v. the
Restatement, 51 MICH. L. REV. 345 (1953); Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family
Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379 (1959); Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict
of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 42 (1940). Intrastate venue disputes, of course, can impose
similar costs on the parties; see infra text accompanying notes 26-30. The absence
of federal constitutional limitations on trial situs within a state has tended to obscure
the relationship between those costs and the powers of courts to impose them.
2. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act SS 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 111-70 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as UCCJA].
3. See Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing
Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L. Q. 203 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody]; Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 1207 (1969); Ehrenzweig, supra note 1; Ratner, Procedural Due Process and
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 363 (1980).
4. Puerto Rico also has not enacted the UCCJA. See official records of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (cited in Brief amici curiae
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Louisiana appellate courts have decided fourteen cases construing the
UCCJA.' The two principal purposes of this article are to analyze
progress toward implementing the model Act in this state and to an-
ticipate constructional problems not yet faced by the extant body of
jurisprudence.
Part I of this article will provide some background discussion of
the nature and scope of jurisdictional problems inherent in interstate
child custody disputes. Part II of this article will focus upon the
jurisdictional framework of the UCCJA. Part III will examine the con-
gruence of Louisiana jurisprudence with the recorded intent of the
Commissioners as well as with decisions from other adopting states.
Part IV will discuss the basic changes in the UCCJA scheme for the
enforcement of interstate custody judgments which have been ac-
complished by the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980.6 While no case governed by this federal statute has yet to reach
the Louisiana appellate courts, critical readjustments in jurisdictional
conceptualizations under the UCCJA are now necessary in order to
ensure that Louisiana custody judgments will be entitled to full faith
and credit in sister states.
I. RUFFLES AND FLOURISHES: THE EICKE CASE
Although the UCCJA has been in force for only five years in Loui-
siana, perhaps the most controversial case decided by any adopting
state has come from the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal.
for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on Behalf of
the Respondent at 5 n.2, Eicke v. Eicke, 103 S. Ct. 776 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Brief amici curiae]).
5. Gibson v. Gibson, 429 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Dillon v. Medellin,
409 So. 2d 570 (La. 1982); Revere v. Revere, 389 So. 2d 1277 (La. 1980); Byrum v.
Hebert, 425 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982): Pittman v. George, 424 So. 2d 1200
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Huston v. Granstaff, 417 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982);
Hust v. Whitehead, 416 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Buchanan v. Malone, 415
So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Losey v. Losey, 412 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1982); Cata v. McKnight, 401 So. 2d 1221 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. granted, 404 So. 2d
264 (La. 1981); Eicke v. Eicke, 399 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406
So. 2d 607 (La. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 970 (1982), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 776
(1983); Hadley v. Hadley, 394 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d
622 (La. 1981); Moore v. Moore, 379 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Parker v.
Parker, 424 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 1198 (La. 1983)
(although Parker is an intrastate jurisdictional dispute, the court's opinion does pro-
vide some dicta about the proper construction of the UCCJA).
6. 28 U.S.C. S 1738A (Supp. V 1981).
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Eicke v. Eicke,' which held that Louisiana would ignore a Texas custody
decree, became an overnight cause celebre when the United States
Supreme Court accepted the petition for certiorari.! After thirty years
of silence,' the Supreme Court now appeared ready to stir once more
the historically muddy waters of interstate child custody jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Louisiana
case because the timing of its appearance seemed perfect. The Eicke
case afforded the Court the opportunity to lay the final part in its
reassembly of fundamental notions of state court power over non-
domiciliary citizens which began in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington"0 and continued through its most recent opinions in Rush
v. Savchuk" and World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson."
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws reacted in alarm to
the prospect of Supreme Court intervention and filed with the Court
a brief amicus curiae which charged:
If this Court grants full faith and credit to the subsequent
Texas decree in this case, the decision will conflict with the
provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), which governed the decisions of the Louisiana courts,
and is, also, in effect in 47 other states. The UCCJA was
drafted to cure defects in the handling of interstate child
7. 399 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 So. 2d 607 (La. 1981), cert.
granted, 456 U.S. 970 (1982), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 776 (1983).
8. 456 U.S. 970 (1982). Since 1962, the Supreme Court has been asked to review
the constitutionality of interstate child custody judgments twelve times. See Miller
v. Miller, 158 Conn. 217, 258 A.2d 89, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969); Borri v. Siver-
son, 336 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977); State ex rel. Fox
v. Webster, 151 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), cert. dismissed, 162 So. 2d 905
(Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Webb v. Webb, 245 Ga. 650, 266 S.E.2d
463, cert. granted, 449 U.S. 819 (1980), appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 493 (1981) (want of
jurisdiction); People ex rel. Loeser v. Loeser, 51 111. 2d 567, 283 N.E.2d 884 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972); Eicke v. Eicke, 399 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 So. 2d 607 (La. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 970 (1982), cert. dismissed,
103 S. Ct. 776 (1983); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 26 Md. App. 427, 338 A.2d 386 (1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976); Joffe v. Joffe, 50 N.J. 265, 234 A.2d 232 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968); Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371, 235 N.E.2d 109, 288 N.Y.S.2d
44 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d
537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); Proctor v. Proctor, 213 Pa. Super. 171,
245 A.2d 684 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 839 (1969); Terrazas v. Riggs, 612 S.W.2d
461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981).
9. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
12. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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custody disputes created by past decisions of this Court. This
Court has, by its decisions, encouraged state autonomy in the
enforcement and modification of the decrees of another state.
In turn, contestants in custody cases have been encouraged
to relitigate cases from state to state, and to engage in
undesirable self-help practices such as seize and run.i"
Accusations that the United States Supreme Court has by its
previous decisions created jurisprudential chaos, abetted state defiance
of the constitutional command of full faith and credit, and encouraged
parental childnapping are not the ordinary, supplicative matter of
briefs amici curiae filed before the Supreme Court. The Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act is the brainchild of the commissioners and
their erudite reporters, but it was conceivable that the Act as cur-
rently written might not survive constitutional scrutiny by the Court."
Assuming the aggressive posture of a mother bear defending her cub,
the amicus brief warned the Court off of the Eicke case.
Six months later, the Supreme Court vacated its grant of cer-
tiorari in Eicke and decamped without opinion. 5 What had occurred
in the interim to change the Court's charted course? Perhaps the most
influential development was the brief amicus curiae in opposition and
the critical firepower of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws which it represented. Perhaps the Court
decided to stay its re-entry into this area of conflicts of law until
greater state experience had accumulated in utilizing the UCCJA, and
until the provisions of the UCCJA had become more refined by judicial
construction. Perhaps a more telling reason for the retreat might be
the Court's recognition of the apparent intractability of child custody
judgments and a certain understandable reluctance to dive into a
morass in which the Court had floundered on more than one past
occasion."
13. Brief amici curiae, supra note 4, at 2.
14. It is anomalous to refer to Louisiana as "the UCCJA state" because in accept-
ing initial jurisdiction in Eicke, the Louisiana court violated the provisions of its own
UCCJA. See infra text accompanying notes 100-03. Thus, even if the United States
Supreme Court had found a lack of jurisdiction in Louisiana, such a ruling would not
necessarily have impaired the validity of the Act's design when properly applied. For
an excellent discussion of potential constitutional flaws in the UCCJA, see Ratner,
supra note 3. For a defense of the Act's constitutionality, see Bodenheimer & Neeley-
Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12
U.C.D. L. Rev. 229 (1979).
15. 103 S. Ct. 776 (1983).
16. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948); New York
ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
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Certainly there is much to support the need for a definitive con-
stitutional decision by the Court on the enforceability of foreign child
custody judgments. Furthermore, the Eicke case presented a commonly
recurring fact pattern. According to the most recent census data, over
one million divorces now occur in the United States each year which
involve over 100,000 children.17 In fact, focusing upon probability in-
stead of fantasy, the Eickes may well represent today's "All American"
family.
Elizabeth and Johannas Eicke remained married slightly over five
years and produced two children before divorcing. 8 Today the average
American marriage lasts 6.6 years and produces two to three
children.19 The combined effect of those two statistics is that there
are a great many young children (i.e., all of whom are under the age
of six) whose custody must be determined either by consent or by
a court when their parents decide to go their separate ways. Had
the Eicke family remained in Texas to end the marriage where it
had begun, the spectre of inconsistent, enforcement-numbing decrees
from Texas and Louisiana would have been avoided. But, again, the
Eickes acted predictably: deciding to separate, Elizabeth Eicke moved
with the children to Louisiana. Every year seven million Americans
change domicile,"° many of whom migrate to establish new homes
elsewhere because of separation and divorce.
Johannas Eicke and Elizabeth Eicke each sought a custody decree
from his/her "home court"; unfortunately, as it all too frequently hap-
pens, each obtained a judgment entitling the bearer to the posses-
sion, care and control of the two children of the marriage. Paradigmatic
interstate custody litigants, each Eicke parent was served with notice
of the action for custody filed by the other, and each defaulted, prefer-
ring a collateral attack on the conflicting decree over a direct con-
17. Jellinek & Slovik, Divorce: Impact on Children, 305 NEW ENG. OF MED. 557
(1981). The accelerating rise in the incidence of children of divorce is dramatic. Each
year from 1972 to 1979 over a million new children under the age of eighteen ex-
perienced the divorce of their parents and the disruption of their families. J. WALLER-
STEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 5-6 (1980). It has been projected that thirty
percent of all children growing up in the 1970's will experience the divorce of their
parents. Bane, Marital Disruption and the Lives of Children, in DIVORCE AND SEPARA-
TION 281 (G. Levinger & 0. Moles ed. 1979).
18. These facts and all others regarding the Eicke family are found in the Loui-
siana appellate court opinion. Eicke, 399 So. 2d 1231.
19. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, Advance Report: Final Divorce
Statistics, 1978, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July 31,1980), reviewed
by Jellinek & Slovik, supra note 17.
20. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1973,
at 37 (1973).
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frontation in either forum. The only atypical behavior of the Eickes was
that neither parent resorted to self-help by "childnapping"'" or other
bootstrapping conduct aimed at enhancing a claim of home forum jurisdic-
tion. Prior to 1981 when the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
of 19801 became effective, it was estimated that between 25,000 and
100,000 cases of child snatching by contesting parents occurred each
year."3
As a result of the Supreme Court's ambivalence in the Eicke.
case, the ardor of debate about the constitutionality of the UCCJA
will undoubtedly be dampened."' Yet the probability that the Court
will not soon repeat last term's about-face means that the UCCJA
will remain the controlling mechanism for resolving interstate jurisdic-
tional disputes in the foreseeable future. Therefore, a thorough
understanding of the Act's provisions is necessary for courts, lawyers,
and custody litigants in all states, including Louisiana.
The UCCJA consists of a number of interlocking sections, each
of which has a significant part to play in the operation of the statutory
mechanism. 5 However, this article will be primarily concerned with
those portions of the UCCJA which prescribe the basic tenets for
initial and modification jurisdiction and those provisions which allow
an empowered court in its discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME: THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT
Applicability of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act purports to control
the resolution of potential jurisdictional conflicts between the courts
21. See infra text accompanying notes 153-80.
22. See infra note 102.
23. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Sub-
comm. on Child and Human Dev. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1980) (statement of Sara Keegan, former Coordinator of the
Single Parent Family Program, Dep't of Community Affairs, Providence, R.I.)
[hereinafter cited as Joint Hearing].
24. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 3.
25. For a detailed analysis of the Act, see R. CROUCH, INTERSTATE CUSTODY LITIGA-
TION: A GUIDE TO USE AND COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT (1981); Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Ex-
cessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 978 (1977); Coombs, Interstate Child Custody:
Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711 (1982).
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of two or more states. However, an identical potential for forum-
shopping and conflicting decrees can and often does arise in the con-
text of intrastate litigation under the guise of venue challenges. In
many states, venue wars occurring within the microcosm of a state
are still encouraged by the same atavistic policies of local control and
territoriality' which finally prompted the promulgation of the UCCJA
for the macrocosmic federal system.
By adopting the UCCJA, presumably a state has determined that
the Act's purposes are wise and that its design is soundly constructed
to achieve a better public order. In less abstract terms, it is difficult
to understand, for example, how a court in Shreveport is more com-
petent to assess evidence arising within a child's home in New Orleans
than it would be if the child, instead, had always lived in Texarkana.
In terms of the dislocation costs imposed upon the litigants themselves,
it is surely no less expensive or discomfiting for a parent and child
who live in Shreveport to try a custody case in New Orleans rather
than in nearer Texarkana. Certainly, there is no choice of law issue
in intrastate child custody disputes, but, likewise, there are no con-
flicts in substantive doctrine which are inherent in interstate contests.
The universal standard governing the merits of custody proceedings
between parents is "the best interests of the child."27
Some states have responded to this congruence of concerns by
enacting child custody venue statutes parallel in purpose and design
to the UCCJA.8 Parker v. Parker29 is the only Louisiana case to date
which concerns the applicability of the UCCJA to conflicting jurisdic-
tional claims by courts of different parishes. Although the fifth cir-
cuit in Parker found the UCCJA to be inapplicable to such intrastate
disputes, it ultimately approved venue in the parish in which the child
was residing at the time the custody proceeding was filed. Thus, as
will be demonstrated later, the ruling in Parker is consistent with
the values rubric of the UCCJA, even though the Act's finely tuned
mechanisms for such decision-making were not utilized.'
26. Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241;
Ratner, supra note 3; see infra text accompanying notes 222-24.
27. See McGough & Shindell, Coming of Age: Best Interests of the Child Standard
in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209 (1978).
28. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. SS 19-9-20 to -24 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
29. 424 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), writ. denied, 427 So. 2d 1198 (La. 1983).
30. In Parker, the competing claims to jurisdiction were as follows: A court in
Iberia Parish had rendered the initial divorce decree and a subsequent modification
of custody decree; Lafourche Parish was the domicile of the father; Jefferson Parish
was the domicile of the child's maternal grandparents with whom the child had lived
since June 1981. Although the mother claimed to have assumed a new domicile in
Colorado, the appellate court observed that the record was devoid of the usual proofs
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The UCCJA focuses upon the power of a potential forum to make
a custody determination. According to the Act, a "custody determina-
tion" includes any court decision, order or even instructions "providing
for the custody of a child, including visitation rights."3' Though the
term "custody" is nowhere defined in the Act, it is apparently to be
understood in its common usage as a bundle of constituent rights to
a child's possession, care, and control, including parental authority to
make decisions affecting the course of a child's development during
his minority.32 The UCCJA takes into account the fact that custody
determinations occur not only within actions for divorce or separa-
tion but also within a variety of other types of litigation. The com-
missioners' note to section 2 of the UCCJA indicates that "custody
proceeding" is a generic term intended to be broadly applied to en-
compass habeas corpus actions, guardianship petitions, and all other
comparable actions available under labels varying from state to state.33
The Louisiana appellate courts have displayed no difficulty in using
the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA to govern custody decision-
making in the course of actions seeking separation;34 divorce;3
tutorship;" a change of custody,37 including reduction of visitation
rights;"8 habeas corpus; 39 and other actions to enforce an extant
decree."
What has yet to be decided by the Louisiana courts, however,
is whether the UCCJA is applicable to interstate disputes arising from
actions brought pursuant to the state's parens patriae power to remove
of a change of permanent residence from Jefferson Parish. 424 So. 2d at 481. After
the decision in Parker, the Louisiana legislature enacted article 74.2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which provides for venue in custody actions. 1983 La. Acts, No. 62, 5 1.
31. UCCJA S 2(2), 9 U.L.A. 119 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1701(2) (1983)]. This section also
explicitly excludes decisions about child support "or any other monetary obligation
of any person." Consequently, the ruling was correct in Moore v. Moore, 379 So. 2d
1153, 1157 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), that the mother's action to increase child support
should be governed by general jurisdictional rules rather than the special rules of
the UCCJA.
32. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES S 17.5
(1968); LA. CIv. CODE art. 227.
33. UCCJA S 2, commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 120 (1968).
34. Losey v. Losey, 412 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
35. Id.
36. Huston v. Granstaff, 417 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
37. Revere v. Revere, 389 So. 2d 1277 (La. 1980); Hust v. Whitehead, 416 So. 2d
639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
38. Moore v. Moore, 379 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
39. Buchanan v. Malone, 415 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
40. Dillon v. Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570 (La. 1982); Cata v. McKnight, 401 So. 2d
1221 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. granted, 404 So. 2d 264 (La. 1981).
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a neglected or endangered child from a custodian's care temporarily,"'
or permanently through an action to terminate parental rights. 2 Ac-
cording to previous analysis of the UCCJA's impact upon Louisiana
law, the UCCJA was deemed inapplicable to public actions initiated
or certified by any state official and also apparently to adoptions. '
Nevertheless, in its definitions section, the UCCJA expressly states
that the term "custody proceeding" includes "child neglect and
dependency proceedings."" "Dependency proceedings," as state actions
are known in many states," would appear to encompass Louisiana pro-
ceedings variously known as "abandonment," "child in need of care"
or "termination of parental rights" actions."6 Furthermore, Professor
Bodenheimer, the drafter and reporter for the UCCJA, has written
that the UCCJA was intended to apply to all such actions.47 Most im-
portantly, the state's concerns in private custody disputes, adoptions,
and neglect/abandonment actions are similar, 8 and logically the same
jurisdictional rules should govern the resolution of all such matters
which have interstate elements. As Professor Bodenheimer observed:
In all these cases the core question is where and with whom
a child should live when something has occurred to disrupt
the family. The character of child custody adjudication is en-
tirely different from child support proceedings and other ac-
tions involving monetary or property claims. . . . Courts no
longer "dispose of" children like chattels or valuable prizes
fought over by others. They recognize children as persons with
rights and interests to be protected.'
41. See infra note 226; see also LA. R.S. 13:1570-:1599 (1983).
42. LA. R.S. 13:1600-:1606 (1983); LA. R.S. 9:403-:407 (1965 & Supp. 1983).
43. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1978 Regular Session-Persons,
39 LA. L. REV. 107, 108 n.9 (1978).
44. UCCJA S 2(3), 9 U.L.A. 119 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1701(3) (1983)].
45. Many states use the labels "neglect" and "dependency" interchangeably in
their juvenile court jurisdictional provisions. There is, however, some discernible trend
toward reserving the term "neglect" for willful parental misconduct and using
"dependency" for lack of proper care due to physical, mental or financial inability of
the parent or due to the parent's death or absence. For a discussion of terminology
and recommendations, see THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 27-28 (1967).
46. See statutes cited supra note 42.
47. See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 14, at 252-53.
48. Although beyond the scope of this article, there may be a distinction of con-
stitutional magnitude between a state's power to affect a nonresident parent's rights
to present custody and its power to terminate all parental rights of such a parent.
Thus, if the UCCJA is properly to be construed as encompassing termination actions,
a grave due process problem is engendered by the sweep of its authorization. For
further discussion, see Ratner, supra note 3.
49. Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 14, at 232-33.
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To date only one Louisiana case has raised the question of the
UCCJA's applicability to interstate adoption proceedings. In that case,
Byrum v. Hebert,5 the third circuit ruled that the Texas adoption
decree was entitled to full faith and credit. However, the court based
its decision not upon the UCCJA but upon Article 10(1) of the Code
of Civil Procedure." The Louisiana Supreme Court has expressly
reserved ruling on the applicability of the UCCJA to proceedings in
the juvenile courts."
Jurisdictional Bases
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act reflects two para-
mount purposes: avoiding jurisdictional competition among states and
promoting resolution of custody disputes by the forum deemed most
likely to have the maximum amount of relevant information about the
case.' Accordingly, the Act as a matter of fundamental policy rejects
any "in rem" model for justifying jurisdiction. Short term or temporary
presence of a child within a state is not likely to yield the best fac-
tual environment or assure that conflicts between judgments are
unlikely. Instead, to meet these concerns, the Act sets up a hierarchy
of jurisdictional tests by which a state court can determine whether
it has power to render a custody decree which will be recognized by
sister states. The system utilizes a scheme of potentially concurrent
50. 425 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
51. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 10(1) provides:
A court which is otherwise competent under the laws of this state has
jurisdiction of...:
(1) An adoption proceeding if the person who has legal custody of the child
is domiciled, or the child is lawfully, in this state, and the court has personal
jurisdiction over the adoptive parent; or if the latter is domiciled in this
state, and the court has personal jurisdiction over the legal custodian.
It should be noted that under the UCCJA, the adoption decree would clearly have
been entitled to full faith and credit since at the time of rendition Texas was the
home state of the children.
See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
52. See Dillon v. Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570, 575 n.4 (La. 1982).
53. Although there are nine enumerated purposes of the UCCJA, only one direct-
ly relates to the choice of a particular forum in preference to others. That purpose
expressed in section 1(a)(3) is to:
[Alssure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place or-
dinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest
connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts
of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family
have a closer connection with another state.
9 U.L.A. 117 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1700(A)(3) (1983)].
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jurisdiction, albeit in descending preferential order, and provides
mechanisms for declining the exercise of jurisdiction should this con-
currence present a problem of competition between two or more
states.
The basic jurisdictional requisites contained in section 3' of the
UCCJA give the courts of a state the power to adjudicate a child's
status when the forum fits into one of four categories. The first, and
most preferred, category is commonly referred to as "home state"
jurisdiction and is based solely upon the amount of time the child
and at least one parent have resided in the state. "Home state" is
defined as that state in which a child has lived with a parent or per-
son acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months prior to
the "time involved."" "Home state" jurisdiction arises when the state:
(i) is the home state of the child at the time of commence-
ment of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state
within 6 months before commencement of the proceeding and
the child is absent from this State because of his removal or
retention by a person claiming his custody . . ., and a parent
or person acting as parent continues to live in this State."
Thus, the state in which the child has lived for at least six consecutive
months becomes his home state for purposes of the Act. Conversely,
even though the child is removed by one claiming the right to custody,
that state will retain home state status for an additional six months,
the time it would take to acquire a new home state. Implicit in the
rank-order design of the UCCJA is the presumption that a child's best
interests will ordinarily be served by the assumption of jurisdiction
by his home state court.
The second category of jurisdiction, following the Act's rank-order,
is generally called "significant connection" jurisdiction. This grant of
jurisdiction is less directly dependent upon the time the family has
spent in the state, although the operative factor in its application
seems to be the closeness of a state's ties to the family. 7 The re-
quirements for use of this section are that: (1) it must be in the best
interest of the child; (2) the child and at least one parent must have
54. 9 U.L.A. 122-23 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702 (1983)].
55. UCCJA S 2(5), 9 U.L.A. 119 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1701(5) (1983)]. Presumably the
phrase "time involved" refers to the time pivot used in the following jurisdictional
section, i.e., "the time of commencement of the proceeding." UCCJA S 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A.
122 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(1) (1983)].
56. UCCJA S 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(1) (1983)].
57. UCCJA S 3, commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 123-24 (1968).
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a significant connection with the state; and (3) there must be within
the state substantial evidence concerning the child.58
The commissioners' note discussing the interrelationship between
"home state" and "significant connection" jurisdiction under the
UCCJA indicates that courts possessing the latter type of jurisdic-
tion are to exercise it
if there is no home state or the child and his family have equal
or stronger ties with another state. . . . If this alternative
test produces concurrent jurisdiction in more than one state,
the mechanisms provided in sections 6 [simultaneous pro-
ceedings] and 7 [inconvenient forum] are used to assure that
only one state makes the custody decision.59
Apparently aware that this concurrent jurisdictional scheme would
be controversial, the commissioners note that it was fashioned in such
broadly worded terms in order to cover a variety of fact patterns
and to insure flexibility consistent with the overriding purpose of the
UCCJA. According to the drafters:
The first clause of the paragraph is important: jurisdiction ex-
ists only if it is in the child's interest, not merely the interest
or convenience of the feuding parties, to determine custody
in a particular state. The interest of the child is served when
the forum has optimum access to relevant evidence about the
child and family. There must be maximum rather than
minimum contact with the state."
The commissioners next provided what has been called "emergency"
jurisdiction, designed to apply when a child is found within a state
abandoned, abused, or neglected. "Emergency" jurisdiction arises when
"the child is physically present in this state and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment
or abuse or is otherwise neglected [or dependent]."6 Quite obviously,
this type of jurisdiction appears to open a well-spring which could
be tapped to justify the exercise of power in almost any custody con-
troversy. To avoid unwarranted expansion of the emergency power,
the commissioners cautioned that such "extraordinary jurisdiction is
58. UCCJA S 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(2) (1983)].
59. UCCJA § 3, commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 123 (1968) (emphasis added). The
access to information goal of the UCCJA is set out in subsection 1(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 117
(1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1700(A)(3) (1983)].
60. UCCJA S 3, commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 124 (1968).
61. UCCJA S 3(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(3) (1983)].
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reserved for extraordinary circumstances." 2 Allegations of inadequate
or improper care are highly susceptible to distortion. In a state pro-
secution for neglect there is some objective mechanism for filtering
out spiteful or exaggerated complaints of child neglect before pro-
ceeding with charges;" no such check exists in a private custody
dispute. Consequently, under the UCCJA, a trial court must exercise
great self-restraint in order to avoid lending a forum to specious claims
of emergency by embattled parents. Nevertheless, when a child's life
seems truly endangered and a state cannot meet the requirements
for home state or significant connection jurisdiction, the state may
assert jurisdiction to protect the child's welfare under this provision
of the Act.
Finally, there is a "residual" category, which allows a state to
assume jurisdiction over a custody dispute when no other state meets
the requisites of the previous sections or when another state has
declined to assert its jurisdictional power. 4 This section, like the
emergency power, allows a court to depart from the Act's general
rule that mere physical presence of the child in a state is insufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon its courts.
Jurisdictional Determinations
The first inquiry under the UCCJA is always whether the forum
state has jurisdiction under section 3, that is, whether it can meet
the requirements of one or more of the four categories. The second
inquiry is always whether or not another state has claim to jurisdic-
tion. In order to minimize interstate friction and to preclude the en-
try of inconsistent state decrees, the UCCJA is purposively designed
like a three-stage rocket: before a forum is authorized to proceed,
the litigants must present information regarding the potential or ac-
tual pending jurisdiction of another state; the forum must then com-
municate with other potential forums; and finally, if the states hav-
ing potential jurisdiction cannot agree upon which is to proceed, the
deadlock is broken by an arbitrarily imposed priority-of-filing rule.
The first stage of analysis provides a check by imposing a duty
of disclosure upon the party litigants. The UCCJA requires all par-
ties to provide the forum with all information necessary for it to learn
of any prior judgments, pending proceedings, or potential claims to
62. UCCJA S 3, commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 124 (1968); see also infra note 224.
63. See discussion in Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269 So. 2d 217 (1972).
64. UCCJA S 3(a)(4), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(4) (1983)].
65. See Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 210-13.
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jurisdiction which might be asserted by any other states.66 As the
commissioners' note to section 9 of the UCCJA cautions: "It is impor-
tant for the court to receive the information listed and other perti-
nent facts as early as possible for purposes of determining its jurisdic-
tion, the joinder of additional parties, and the identification of courts
in other states which are to be contacted . . . ."" However, the UCCJA
does not indicate what penalty, if any, is to be imposed if a party
fails to disclose the existence of another state's potential jurisdiction.
The recognition section of the Act is ambiguous: "The courts of
this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree
of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under
statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which
was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional stan-
dards of the Act ... 8 At least one state has construed this section
as incorporating the duty of disclosure as a jurisdictional prerequisite.
In the only case which has clearly presented this issue under the
UCCJA, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's failure
to disclose the foreign proceedings vitiated the jurisdictional founda-
tion of his decree, and thus the decree need not be accorded full faith
and credit. 9
Obviously, this issue of whether disclosure is a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite is a matter of grave constitutional concern. The United States
Supreme Court has indicated that when a foreign judgment is
presented for recognition in a sister state, the sole inquiry permitted
under the Full Faith and Credit command is whether the state of
rendition possessed jurisdiction. Defects in pleadings or the form of
the judgment must be ignored.7 1 In their brief amicus curiae filed with
the Supreme Court in the Eicke case, the commissioners apparently
take the position that the parties' duty of disclosure under the UCC-
JA is mandatory: that the withholding of information results in a fatal-
66. Subsections 9(a)(1)-(2), 9 U.L.A. 145 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1708(A)(1)-(2) (1983)] im-
pose the duty of disclosure of any other litigation concerning the custody of the child
as a part of the party's affidavit which must accompany any first pleading. This
disclosure duty is expressly made a continuing responsibility for the duration of the
current action. UCCJA S 9(c), 9 U.L.A. 146 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1708(C) (1983)].
67. UCCJA S 9, commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 146 (1968).
68. UCCJA S 13, 9 U.L.A. 151 (1968) (emphasis added) [LA. R.S. 13:1712 (1983)].
69. Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96, 98-99, 406 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (1980);
see also, Paltrow v. Paltrow, 37 Md. App. 191, 376 A.2d 1134 (1977), aff'd, 283 Md.
291, 383 A.2d 547 (1978); Moser v. Davis, 364 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
70. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226 (1945).
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ly flawed judgment not entitled to full faith and credit from sister
states.71
As a double-check against interstate conflict, the UCCJA clearly
envisions that all potential forums will informally discuss their com-
peting jurisdictional claims "with a view to assuring that jurisdiction
will be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum
will be available to the parties."7 This requirement is one of the most
innovative features of the UCCJA. Because state courts are unused
to such forms of informal communication, it is not surprising that state
courts,73 including Louisiana trial courts,74 have often ignored this duty.
Yet, at least one appellate court, the Court of Appeals of New York,
has ruled that the failure of its trial court to communicate and defer
to a potential claim of jurisdiction in a sister state was reversible
error, "contrary to the avowed purposes of the legislation adopted
by both States. 7
5
If a custody proceeding is pending in a sister state, the forum
is required under the UCCJA to stay its hand pending an inter-court
determination of which state should proceed to adjudicate the dispute. 6
If the two courts cannot agree, the Act gives the right of way to
the forum where the pending action was first filed.7 If a custody judg-
71. "[Wjhen the error goes to the very jurisdiction of the court making the judg-
ment [as section 9 of the UCCJA so requires], it is a matter of the jurisdiction, itself.
And lack of jurisdiction allows a sister state to deny full faith and credit." Brief amici
curiae, supra note 4, at 16. In an opinion rendered by the Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, the court refused enforcement of the Texas custody decree because
Texas law was not in substantial conformity with Louisiana law and the requirements
of the UCCJA. Eicke, 399 So. 2d at 1235-36. Implicit in that ruling is an apparent
determination that the Act's disclosure and communication requirements are jurisdic-
tional. For a discussion of the initial custody decree entered by the Louisiana trial
court, see infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
72. UCCJA S 7(d), 9 U.L.A. 138 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1706(D) (1983)].
73. See, e.g., Webb v. Webb, 245 Ga. 650, 266 S.E.2d 463, cert. granted, 449 U.S.
819 (1980), appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 493 (1981). In states where the UCCJA has been
in force for several years, there is, however, evidence of increasing trial court obe-
dience to the communication requirements. See, e.g., William L. v. Michele P., 99 Misc.
2d 346, 355, 416 N.Y.S.2d 477, 483 (Fam. Ct. 1979); Paltrow v. Paltrow, 37 Md. App.
191, 376 A.2d 1134 (1977), affd, 283 Md. 291, 388 A.2d 547 (1978).
74. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 379 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); see infra
text accompanying notes 123-27.
75. Vanneck v. Vanneck, 49 N.Y.2d 602, 611, 404 N.E.2d 1278, 1282, 427 N.Y.S.2d
735, 739 (1980).
76. UCCJA S 6, 9 U.L.A. 134 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1705 (1983)]; UCCJA S 7(d), 9 U.L.A.
138 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1706(D) (1983)].
77. UCCJA S 6, 9 U.LA. 134 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1705 (1983)]; see Lopez v. District
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ment has been previously entered by a court having jurisdiction which
meets the tests provided by the Act, then the forum can proceed only
in conformity with the special rules governing the more limited exer-
cise of modification power. 8
When, after assessing its claim to adjudicate, a forum determines
that it does indeed have jurisdiction, a number of additional controls
provided by the Act require the forum to decide whether or not it
is appropriate to exercise it. A forum "may decline" jurisdiction if,
using five broadly-worded factors as guidelines, it determines that it
is an "inconvenient forum"79 or that its claim to jurisdiction is based
wholly or in part upon the "reprehensible conduct of a party to the
custody litigation pending before it."8
In fashioning the UCCJA framework, the commissioners chose
communication, discretion and deference among potential forum courts
as the means of resolving the conflicting claims inherent in concur-
rent jurisdiction. In this sense, the motivation behind the Act is vision-
ary and, arguably, merely aspirational. The commissioners relied upon
the premise that a new era of partnership among state courts not
only would be encouraged but also would in fact result from the im-
plementation of the Act's provisions.81 The Louisiana cases in the next
section of this article illustrate some of the tensions prevalent in
custody disputes, as well as the manner in which the UCCJA would
direct the choice between what are often competing policies.
III. LOUISIANA APPELLATE DECISIONS
CONSTRUING THE UNIFORM ACT
Initial Decree Jurisdiction
The question when a Louisiana court can properly exercise the
power to enter an initial decree of custody in an interstate dispute
has been implicitly before the appellate courts in three cases. Losey
Court, 199 Colo. 207, 606 P.2d 853 (1980); see also UCCJA § 6, commissioners' note,
9 U.L.A. 134-35 (1968).
78. UCCJA S 14, 9 U.L.A. 153-54 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1713 (1983)].
79. UCCJA S 7(c), 9 U.L.A. 137-38 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1706(C) (1983)].
80. UCCJA S 8, 9 U.L.A. 142 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1707 (1983)]. This is the so-called
"clean hands" limitation which is discussed further infra text accompanying notes 153-80.
81. As the Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the UCCJA observes:
Underlying the entire Act is the idea that to avoid the jurisdictional con-
flicts and confusions which have done serious harm to innumerable children,
a court in one state must assume major responsibility to determine who is
to have custody of a particular child; that this court must reach out for the
help of courts in other states in order to arrive at a fully informed judgment
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v. Losey," decided by Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal,
presented a commonly recurring fact pattern. Although in Losey the
parents were married in Louisiana, the "matrimonial" or "family"
domicile was established in Delaware. After the husband found work
in Louisiana, the wife refused to move with him. Within the month,
the husband returned to Delaware where he took possession of the
children. s3
Within a month after bringing both children to Louisiana, the
father filed suit in this state seeking both a decree of separation-and
custody of the children. Without revealing its rationale, the trial court
"declined to exercise jurisdiction over the child custody issue while
retaining jurisdiction for the divorce proceeding."84 This decision of
the trial court was not appealed; the sole issue before the appellate
court was the propriety of the trial court's judgment in favor of the
defendant-mother for reimbursement of her expenses in the Louisiana
litigation. 5
Although it appears that the trial and appellate courts were cor-
rect in concluding that a Louisiana court should not exercise jurisdic-
tion upon these facts, the more fundamental question is whether Loui-
siana possessed any jurisdiction at all to decide this child custody case.
In other words, a ruling that a court "declines jurisdiction" presup-
poses that it in fact possesses jurisdiction and is simply staying its
hand. Certainly, the Louisiana trial court's jurisdiction to affect the
marital status of the parties does not necessarily include the power
to award custody of the children to either parent.8 In Losey, the trial
which transcends state lines and considers all claimants, residents and
nonresidents, on an equal basis and from the standpoint of the welfare of
the child. If this can be achieved, it will be less important which court exer-
cises jurisdiction but that courts of the several states involved act in part-
nership to bring about the best possible solution for a child's future.
9 U.L.A. 114 (1968).
82. 412 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
83. The significance of these acts under the "clean hands" limitation is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 153-80.
84. 412 So. 2d at 640.
85. This aspect of the UCCJA is discussed infra text accompanying notes 175-78.
86. According to the United States Supreme Court, actions of separation or divorce
proceed on jurisdictional considerations radically different from those controlling ac-
tions for support or, presumably, child custody. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S.
84 (1978) (child support); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (divorce). In
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), four members of the Court analogized child
custody proceedings to support and alimony proceedings thus requiring in personam
jurisdiction over both spouses; the three dissenters treated child custody disputes as
,status" controversies which are constitutionally indistinguishable from separation and
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court properly acted within its power in retaining jurisdiction of the
separation action while declining to adjudicate the custody dispute.
Do the facts of the Losey case justify the assumption of jurisdic-
tion over the child custody claims under the UCCJA? The child had
been in Louisiana for only one month at the time the father's action
was filed. Consequently, under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1702,87
Delaware had been the home state of the child and would remain so
for six months after the child had left the state. The children, eight
and three years of age, had lived their entire lives within the borders
of Delaware until taken from that state by their father. Furthermore,
there were no allegations of abuse or abandonment upon which a claim
of emergency jurisdiction could be said to have arisen in Louisiana.
This state's only claim to jurisdiction must have rested, if at all, within
the grant of authority known as significant connection jurisdiction.
In order to establish significant connection jurisdiction, the father
in Losey would have had to demonstrate that:
(1) "the child and his parents, or the child and at least one con-
testant, have a significant connection with this State;" and
(2) "there is available in this State substantial evidence concern-
ing the child's present or future care, protection, training, and per-
sonal relationships;" and
(3) "it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this
State assume jurisdiction.""8
It could be argued on behalf of the father that the children were
then with him and that not just "substantial" evidence but all evidence
concerning his plans for their present and future care and training
was within Louisiana, where he and the children then resided. On
his behalf, an ingenious lawyer might even note that the substantial
connection jurisdictional base focuses upon evidence of "present and
future" care rather than evidence of past care; therefore, any evidence
accumulated during the child's previous domicile in Delaware is ir-
relevant for purposes of affixing jurisdiction, although it might well
divorce actions for jurisdictional determinations. Furthermore, as the commissioners'
note to section 3 of the UCCJA explicitly declares: "The submission of the parties
to a forum, perhaps for purposes of divorce, is not sufficient without additional fac-
tors establishing closer ties with the state. Divorce jurisdiction does not necessarily
include custody jurisdiction." 9 U.L.A. 124 (1968). For an excellent discussion of a poten-
tial unifying jurisdictional theory for all interstate disputes, see Hazard, supra note 26.
87. [UCCJA S 3, 9 U.L.A. 122-23 (1968)].
88. LA. R.S. 13:1702(AX2) (1983) [UCCJA S 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1968)].
89. See Revere v. Revere, 389 So. 2d 1277, 1281 n.6 (La. 1980).
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be considered by the Louisiana court in making a decision on the
merits of the competing parental claims to custody."
On its face, the substantial connection basis of jurisdiction is so
broadly worded that it gives rise to such arguments; indeed, it would
seem to confer jurisdiction upon almost any court asked to decide
a case. Where the child and one parental contestant91 are now residing
within a state, a fortiori, important evidence regarding at least that
contestant's claim will be available to the forum. What just as ob-
viously may be missing, however, is information supporting the other
parent's claim. The UCCJA makes access to information about the
"child and his family" and the child's multilateral "personal relations"
its principal jurisdictional criterion.9"
The Act explicitly states: "Except under Paragraphs (3) and (4)
of Section A [emergency and residual jurisdiction], physical presence
in this state of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants,
is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state
to make a child custody determination." 3 This provision does not
distinguish between presence coupled with a claim of domicile (as
might be asserted by the father in Losey) and presence without such
a claim. The UCCJA clearly seeks to avoid the sophistry of past
analyses which have attempted to make custody jurisdiction turn upon
a finding of the "legal domicile" of a minor child.9' As recorded by
Professor Bodenheimer, the "mere presence" rule was fashioned to
limit jurisdiction:
Frequently, children are surreptitiously removed to another
state prior to any custody litigation or pending custody pro-
90. Under LA. R.S. 13:1717 & :1718 [UCCJA SS 18 & 19, 9 U.L.A. 161-62 (1968)], the
forum is authorized to obtain and consider information found within another jurisdic-
tion, including the power to request that a sister court conduct hearings and acquire
evidence thought important to the forum's resolution of the controversy.
91. Although this article uses the term "parent" throughout, it should be noted
that the UCCJA does not distinguish between parents and other persons "acting as
parent." Party status is conferred upon a party as well as "a person, other than a
parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody
by a court or claims a right to custody." UCCJA S 2(9), 9 U.L.A. 120 (1968) [LA. R.S.
13:1701(9) (1983)]. Under the Act, this can mean that a forum has custody jurisdiction
even when it lacks in personam jurisdiction over either of the child's biological parents.
For criticism that this aspect of the UCCJA is unconstitutional, see Ratner, supra
note 3.
92. UCCJA S 1(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 117 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1700(A)(3) (1983)]; see text of
subsection 1(a)(3) supra note 53.
93. UCCJA S 3(b), 9 U.L-A. 122-23 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702(B) (1983)].
94. See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 819, 821 (1944).
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ceedings; or they fail to be returned at the end of an agreed
upon out-of-state visit prior to litigation. The Uniform Act
generally withholds jurisdiction from the state of refuge and
confers jurisdiction on the state of the child's former home. 5
When a forum is asked to take "significant connection" jurisdiction,
its threshold inquiry must be whether it possesses any jurisdiction
whatsoever under the Act. Only if the forum determines that it has
more than the mere presence of the child and parent, that it has "max-
imum" rather than "minimum" contacts with the family," does it reach
the second or third stages of analyses, i.e., whether it is an inconven-
ient forum97 or whether the petitioner lacks "clean hands."98 In con-
struing the Act, the overwhelming majority of states have taken this
position.99 The result reached by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court
of Appeal in Losey cannot be impeached. The only legitimate criticism
of its opinion is that the court failed expressly to hold that a Loui-
siana trial court lacks significant connection jurisdiction in such a
situation.1"'
95. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 205.
96. UCCJA S 3 & commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 122-25 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702
(1983)]. Prior to the enactment of the UCCJA, jurisdiction over the status of minors
was governed by article 10(A)(5) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, which re-
quires only that a minor be domiciled or present in this state. This minimal require-
ment of physical presence is expressly denounced by the UCCJA. UCCJA 5 3(b), 9
U.L.A. 122-23 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702(B) (1983)]. Thus, it would seem that the dictum found
in Moore v. Moore, 379 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), was overinclusive:
"The basic goals of the Act do not appear to vitiate completely the broad grant of
jurisdiction by LSA-C.C.P. Art. 10(A)(5) ...." The thorough analysis done by the
court in this case, however, indicates an understanding of how the UCCJA has closed
the door on prior law. But see Pittman v. George, 424 So. 2d 1200 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1982), in which the first circuit demonstrated an apparent lack of understanding on
this same issue. For a fuller discussion, see Lowe & Hauver, Conflict of Laws in Sup-
port and Custody Cases, 29 LA. "B.J. 241, 243 (1982).
97. See the factoring process of UCCJA S 7(c), 9 U.L.A. 137-38 (1968) [LA. R.S.
13:1706(C) (1983)].
98. UCCJA S 8, 9 U.L.A. 142 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1707 (1983)].
99. On facts quite similar to Losey, an early Michigan case held that despite the
fact that a child had been attending school in Michigan for a few months and had
been living with his father there, this did not amount to the "maximum contact" re-
quired to satisfy the "significant connection" basis for jurisdiction. As the court observed,
Michigan could have claimed jurisdiction only "by exaggerating its minimum contacts.
We refuse to distort the intent and plain meaning of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act to allow this state's assertion of jurisdiction." Bacon v. Bacon, 97 Mich. App.
334, 339 n.3, 293 N.W.2d 819, 821 n.3 (1980); accord, Ben-Yehoshua v. Ben-Yehoshua,
91 Cal. App. 3d 259, 154 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1979); Holman v. Holman, 77 Ill. App. 3d 732,
396 N.E.2d 331 (1979); cf. In re Weinstein, 87 Il. App. 3d 101, 408 N.E.2d 952 (1980).
100. 399 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 So. 2d 607 (La. 1981), cert.
granted, 456 U.S. 970 (1982), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 776 (1983).
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Eicke v. Eicke was the second Louisiana case in which the signifi-
cant connection jurisdiction issue arose. In Eicke, the mother and father
had separated while in the family domicile of Texas, and the mother
moved with the children to Louisiana. Within two months after her
arrival in Louisiana, the mother filed for a legal separation and for
an initial decree of custody. Because six months had not elapsed, Texas
was still the home state of the children. On the facts alleged in the
petition, Louisiana could assert jurisdiction based only upon a claim
to significant connection jurisdiction. Compared with the Losey case,
the Eicke case presents only a slightly stronger fact pattern support-
ing such an assumption of jurisdiction. At least one close relative,
the children's maternal grandmother, resided in Louisiana, and the
Eicke family had lived in Louisiana for a period of at least four months
before returning to Texas where the family ultimately split apart."'
Based upon such a minimal number of contacts with the family,
the Louisiana trial court properly should have found that it lacked
jurisdiction, at least until the point at which the home state jurisdic-
tion of the Texas court had evaporated.' In Eicke, the assumption
of initial jurisdiction by the Louisiana trial court when Texas possessed
greater connections with the family appears unwarranted and violative
of the access-to-information purposes of the UCCJA. 13
In Revere v. Revere,'" the Louisiana Supreme Court faced the ques-
tion whether Louisiana had jurisdiction to modify its own decree after
the child and one parent had resided in another state for several
101. According to reported facts, the Eicke family moved to Louisiana in 1978 and
remained in the state "for a short time" before returning in April 1979 to Texas. The
Eickes separated in Texas on August 9, 1979, and Mrs. Eicke and the children moved
to Louisiana. On October 26, 1979, the Louisiana action was commenced by Mrs. Eicke.
399 So. 2d at 1232.
102. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, S 8(a), 28 U.S.C. S 1738A
(Supp. V 1981) was signed by President Jimmy Carter on December 28, 1980, but did
not become effective until July 1, 1981. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-611, S 2, 94 Stat. 3566, 3567. Had the Act been in force during the
initial round of the Eicke case, the trial court should have refused the case so long
as another state had "home state" jurisdiction. Otherwise, the initial decree entered
by the Louisiana court would not have been entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i) (1983); see discussion of the Act infra text accompanying
notes 190-221.
103. Indeed, one of the ironies of the commissioners' Brief amici curiae, supra note
4, is that it is forced to defend the actions of the Louisiana trial courts, in attempting
to dissuade the Supreme Court from intervening. While Louisiana's denial of enforce-
ment to the Texas decree may have been proper under the UCCJA, the initial assump-
tion of jurisdiction leading to the Louisiana decree was clearly improper.
104. 389 So. 2d 1277 (La. 1980).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
months. Since no out-of-state decree was involved, the trial court pro-
perly resolved the jurisdictional question by analyzing whether a Loui-
siana court could enter an initial decree.' ° In Revere, Louisiana was
the matrimonial domicile of the parents and birthplace of the child.
After the mother's desertion, the father filed for and obtained in Loui-
siana an award of divorce and custody of the child. With the aid of
the paternal grandparents, the father raised the child until his sud-
den death in an accident.
Within one week of the father's death, the mother came to Loui-
siana, claimed her son,"°6 and returned with him to Texas where she
had been living since her remarriage. After the child's departure to
Texas, the grandparents sought custody of the child in Louisiana. Not
surprisingly, the mother excepted to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana
courts. The trial court overruled the exception, and the appellate court
denied the mother's application for supervisory writs. The Louisiana
Supreme Court granted certiorari,"7 and in its opinion took the op-
portunity to discuss the jurisdictional bases of the UCCJA.
The supreme court noted that, arguably, the trial court had either
home state or significant connection jurisdiction. The Louisiana court's
home state jurisdiction was in doubt because the precise date of the
child's departure from the state was disputed. The supreme court
therefore resolved the case upon the alternative basis of significant
connections. The Revere decision details those facts which indicated
that the stronger family ties were with Louisiana rather than Texas.
The parents had been married and had established a matrimonial
domicile in Louisiana. The child had been born in Louisiana and had
spent all of his life in the state, except for approximately six months
preceding the commencement of this action. Except for the mother
and child, all relevant witnesses resided in the state. Additionally,
the child's major asset was a claim for the wrongful death of his father
which was at that time pending in a Louisiana court. Finally, the court
found that the grandparents' petition raised substantial questions as
to the mother's fitness as a parent and that the events upon which
the allegations were made had taken place in Louisiana.
Based upon all these factors, the supreme court determined that
105. Modification of out-of-stafe decrees is governed by section 14 of the UCCJA,
9 U.L.A. 153-54 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1713 (1983)]. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
106. It should be noted that the mother did not act improperly. She petitioned
for a change of custody and obtained an ex parte custody order from the St. Tammany
Parish District Court. The validity of this order was never questioned before the Loui-
siana Supreme Court. 389 So. 2d at 1278.
107. 384 So. 2d 804 (La. 1980).
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Louisiana had the requisite connections with this family to assume
jurisdiction under the significant connection standard. In detailing the
length of time the child and his family had spent in this state, as
well as the other related factors, the court was responsive not only
to the letter but also to the spirit of the Act's limited authorization
of significant connection jurisdiction. Having approved the finding of
jurisdiction in the Louisiana trial court, the supreme court then cor-
rectly observed that a significant connection court is not always re-
quired to defer to the home state court."8 In making that determina-
tion under the UCCJA, the forum is to apply the five-factor incon-
venient forum test set out in Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1706(C)."9
The supreme court concluded that Louisiana was a convenient forum
under these criteria and therefore affirmed Louisiana's exercise of
jurisdiction. The court's cautious use of the significant connection basis
for jurisdiction, as well as its analytical method for resolving conflicts
of concurrent jurisdiction, makes the Revere decision an excellent
model for future cases, whether the issue is one of initial or modifica-
tion jurisdiction.
Revere also seems to be in accord with decisions of other jurisdic-
tions in terms of its circumspect use of the significant connection stan-
dard. In Holland v. Holland,1 0 for example, a North Carolina court
considered a petition for original custody filed by a mother domiciled
in that state. The father was domiciled in Georgia where the child
had lived for six years. The child went to live with his father at the
age of five; at the time of the custody action, the child was eleven.
The North Carolina court found that the most recent evidence con-
cerning the child's community, school and health existed in Georgia.
Additionally, although the mother contended that a number of
witnesses in North Carolina could testify as to the family situation
which would exist in that state, the court found that the most rele-
vant witnesses resided in Georgia where the child and his father had
lived for the past six years. Thus, there was no jurisdiction in North
Carolina.
In Brokus v. Brokus,' an Indiana court was required to decide
whether significant connection jurisdiction had arisen during the five
months a mother and her children had resided in the state. During
that period of time, the children had been enrolled in school and had
joined and regularly attended a local church. Since there were neither
108. See supra text accompanying note 59.
109. [UCCJA S 7(c), 9 U.L.A. 137-38 (1968)].
110. 56 N.C. App. 96, 286 S.E2d 895 (1982).
111. 420 N.E.2d 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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equal nor superior contacts between the family and any other state,
the court found that the contacts were sufficient to vest jurisdiction
in the Indiana courts.
Under the UCCJA, as an alternative to home state or significant
connection jurisdiction, a forum may have emergency jurisdiction to
enter an initial custody decree. Although there is as yet no binding
precedent in Louisiana,"' the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion in
Dillon v. Medellin"' contains important dicta about both the nature
and scope of emergency jurisdiction under the Act. Justice Calogero's
discourse on emergency jurisdiction is all the more compelling for
future Louisiana cases because it poses the converse of the question
actually before the Court in Dillon.
Another way of looking at the legal question is this: if the
roles of the Texas and Louisiana courts were reversed, and
the father was the Louisiana resident asking our courts [to
take emergency jurisdiction and] to grant him custody of his
child, a Texas domiciliary, would a Louisiana court be the pro-
per forum for resolving this custody matter?"4
Among other judgments under view in Dillon was a Texas order
naming the father temporary managing conservator of the child. This
order had resulted from a modification petition filed in Texas by the
father while exercising visitation rights with his child in Texas.
Emergency jurisdiction was based upon claims that the child had
reported a use of marijuana and "sexual games" in the mother's home
in Louisiana which justified the father's not relinquishing the child
to her." '1 In reaching its decision that the Texas decree was not bind-
112. Huston v. Granstaff, 417 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), is a case in which
a father sought a custody decree from a Louisiana trial court based upon emergency
jurisdiction. The parents, unmarried cohabitants, conceived a child in Louisiana, but
before her daughter's birth, the mother moved to Texas. Shortly after the child was
born, the father went to Texas and under the ruse of a week's visit, brought the
child to Louisiana and filed a tutorship petition. The trial court named the father pro-
visional tutor; however, later upon petition by the mother to nullify that decree for
want of any emergency jurisdiction, the trial court admitted error. The third circuit
by implication affirmed the lack of emergency jurisdiction although this issue is not
discussed in its opinion. In Gibson v. Gibson, 429 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983),
the third circuit found little on the facts to support the bona fide assertion of emergency
jurisdiction and cited as authority, Dillon v. Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570 (La. 1982), discussed
infra text accompanying notes 113-19. The Gibson opinion devotes only a few sentences
to the consideration of emergency jurisdiction.
113. 409 So. 2d 570 (La. 1982).
114. Id. at 573-74.
115. Id. at 572. Dillon is yet another Texas-Louisiana dispute complicated by the
fact that Texas has not yet adopted the UCCJA in substantial part. Texas law does
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ing for lack of jurisdiction, the Louisiana Supreme Court made two
important observations about the nature of emergency jurisdiction
under the UCCJA.
First, Justice Calogero recognized that emergency jurisdiction
under the UCCJA is to be sparingly assumed "only if the immediate
needs of the child require it because the child has been abandoned
or otherwise mistreated, abused, or neglected.""' The opinion then
distinguishes between a neglect proceeding initiated in the juvenile
courts by the state as parens patriae.7 and allegations of neglect within
a "civil custody matter between two competing parents.""8
Secondly, the supreme court limited the assertion of emergency
jurisdiction to allegations of neglect or abuse occurring within the
forum. The linchpin of the UCCJA, maximizing access to relevant in-
formation, would be violated if a forum attempted to resolve eviden-
tiary disputes about neglect and abuse which allegedly occurred in
another state. In Dillon, Texas can be properly characterized as the
"asylum" state where the child was wrongfully being held over after
a period of visitation; Louisiana was the home state of the child. The
father filed his action in the asylum state seeking a review of injurious
conditions which allegedly existed in the home state. As Justice
Calogero emphasized:
The statute contemplates that conditions in the asylum state
and the immediacy of those conditions will provide both the
necessity and the justification for the asylum state's assum-
ing jurisdiction over a custody matter not otherwise within
its province .... We do not construe La.R.S. 13:1702(A)(3) to
mean that a child visiting an asylum state may be found to
be in an emergency state of mistreatment, abuse, neglect or
dependency because of allegations concerning conditions pur-
portedly existing in the home state, conditions more ap-
propriately and conveniently subject to the scrutiny of the
courts of the domicile state."9
confer emergency jurisdiction upon its court in custody cases, Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
S 11.045(a)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1983); however, the exercise of such power by the Texas
court on these facts was inconsistent with the emergency jurisdiction limitations of
the UCCJA. See, e.g., Caskey v. Pickett, 274 Ark. 383, 625 S.W.2d 473 (1981). Of course,
if a Louisiana trial court is presented with a custody decree from a sister state which
had taken jurisdiction under the UCCJA or laws "substantially in accordance with"
the UCCJA, Louisiana would be required to enforce any resulting foreign decree. LA.
R.S. 13:1712 (1983) [UCCJA S 13, 9 U.L.A. 151 (1968)].
116. 409 So. 2d at 575.
117. See CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:74-:75.2 (1974 & Supp. 1983).
118. 409 So. 2d at 575 n.4.
119. Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
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Subsequent Dispute Jurisdiction: Enforcement and Modification Actions
The UCCJA affects not only the determination of which forum
has initial decree jurisdiction but also the determination of which
forum has jurisdiction to modify a prior custody judgment. Provisions
limiting modification jurisdiction are necessary because the keystone
of any scheme which would rectify the historic abuse committed in
the name of full faith and credit must be the regulation of modifica-
tion power. If a potential modification forum possesses the power
freely to alter the terms of a prior foreign judgment, then the initial
decree may become merely a meaningless gesture feebly made by a
sister state and a mockery of federalism.
Unlike other judgments, a child custody decree may not forever
fix the rights and obligations of the parent parties nor necessarily
diminish their continuing controversies over the child's care and con-
trol. For, unlike divorce, the initial custody judgment severs neither
the personal relationship between parent and child nor the personal
relationship between the two adults as parents of the same child. In-
stead, an initial custody judgment simply creates a new triad of legal
relationships which govern the child's care during his minority.
In the period of transition following divorce, most parents are able
to resolve amicably any unanticipated problems and ambiguities of
their custody decree. Some parents, however, cannot agree and con-
tinue to seek redress through litigation. Where the parents now reside
in different states, the costs of relitigating one parent's post-decree
claims in the other parent's domicile can be substantial; therefore,
each parent desires to have the modification contest heard in his or
her own home state. A custody decree is never final, in the sense
that it may always be modified by the rendering court or another
proper court.'0
The basic framework of modification jurisdiction under the UCCJA
is contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1713(A), 2' which provides:
If a court of another state has made a custody decree,
a court of this state shall not modify that decree unless it
appears to the court of this state that the court which
rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with
this Part or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the
decree and the court of this state has jurisdiction.
120. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
121. [UCCJA S 14(a), 9 U.L.A. 153-54 (1968)].
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This section of the Act incorporates the requirements of initial
decree jurisdiction in two ways: the modifying court must determine,
under one of the jurisdictional categories listed in Louisiana Revised
Statutes 13:170211 that (1) it has jurisdiction and (2) the court which
rendered the original decree does not have jurisdiction over the ac-
tion at the time the action is filed.
In Moore v. Moore,"3 the first case to discuss the UCCJA as
enacted in Louisiana, the court was faced with a petition brought by
a custodial parent for modification of an out-of-state custody decree.
The family involved in this action initially lived in New Mexico, where
the mother had filed for divorce and custody before moving to Loui-
siana in July, 1978. The final decree was rendered in New Mexico
in October of the same year. It awarded the mother a divorce and
custody of the child, with additional provisions addressing visitation
rights and child support. The following March, some eight months after
mother and child moved to Louisiana, the mother filed a rule in the
Louisiana court to show cause why the visitation should not be
decreased and the child support increased.2 4
The trial judge dismissed the rule based upon the first inquiry
under the UCCJA, i.e., that Louisiana lacked jurisdiction over the
action. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, find-
ing that under the criteria set forth in the UCCJA Louisiana was
the home state of the child.' The court recognized, however, that
this finding did not dispose of the case since this was an action for
modification of an existing decree. The court was therefore also re-
quired to find that New Mexico was without jurisdiction over the
dispute.
In making the second inquiry under the UCCJA, the court ad-
dressed the initial decree's jurisdictional bases and eliminated them,
one by one. When the action was filed, New Mexico was clearly no
longer the child's home state. The court then applied the significant
connection standard, which was New Mexico's best claim to
jurisdiction.2" According to the evidence, New Mexico's only remain-
122. [UCCJA S 3, 9 U.L.A. 122-23 (1968)].
123. 379 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
124. Although the assessment of jurisdiction to award or modify child support is
not governed by the UCCJA, see supra note 31, there remains grave doubt about the
trial court's power to alter the support duties of a nonresident defendant. See Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
125. 379 So. 2d at 1155.
126. Emergency and residual jurisdiction could be summarily rejected on these facts
and the court relegated their consideration to a footnote. Id. at 1155 n.4.
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ing connections were that the father lived there and that the child
had resided there throughout infancy. The only information available
about the child in New Mexico was that which her father could pro-
vide. Since the child was only about two years old, the most recent
one-third of her life had been spent in Louisiana with her mother and
maternal grandmother. Considering these circumstances, the second
circuit concluded that Louisiana was the state with optimum access
to information regarding the child. Although the Moore decision is
a close call, a trial court would be well within its discretion in finding
that the previous jurisdiction of the New Mexico court had become
too attenuated to justify its continuing power over this subsequent
skirmish.'27
Of course, a great deal of costly time and effort could have been
saved-in the Moore litigation had the trial court simply communicated
with its sister court and obtained its declination of jurisdiction. In
gray area decision-making such as was involved in the significant con-
nection assessment in Moore, a trial court should make every effort
to avoid the potential jurisdictional impasse by obtaining the original
forum's formal declination. While the UCCJA does not mandate such
a procedure by a forum when no foreign action is currently pending,
this approach seems patently more efficient than the procedure
followed in Moore.
The modification section of the UCCJA makes mandatory the two-
fold inquiry made by the second circuit in Moore. If the state which
rendered the original decree retains, under the Act, jurisdiction over
the status of the child, another state cannot modify that decree. This
mandate is made clear by the commissioners' note to the Act, which
states: "In other words, all petitions for modification are to be ad-
dressed to the prior state if that state has sufficient contact with the
case to satisfy section 3."18
This analysis has also been accepted as correct in other jurisdic-
tions. In Leslie L.F. v. Constance F.,'29 the New York court did not
engage in a detailed review of California's potential jurisdiction as
did the Louisiana court in Moore; however, it did determine that
California was not the home state and that the California court had
failed to respond to overtures made by the New York court about
which state should adjudicate the dispute. Thus, the New York court
127. But see discussion of continuing jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980, infra text accompanying notes 208-21.
128. UCCJA S 14, commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 154 (1968).
129. 110 Misc. 2d 86, 441 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
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determined there was a reasonable argument that California either
did not have jurisdiction or had declined to exercise it.
Unfortunately, the model of UCCJA analysis established by the
Louisiana second circuit has not been universally followed. An exam-
ple is the fourth circuit's decision in Hadley v. Hadley.3 ' Hadley not
only expanded the interpretation of significant connection jurisdiction
beyond that contemplated by the UCCJA but also violated the Act's
restrictions on modifications.
The family involved in Hadley Qriginally lived in Rhode Island.
In 1976, the mother was there awarded a divorce and custody of the
child of the marriage. The parents continued to struggle over custody
and visitation even after the mother remarried and moved a short
distance away to Massachusetts. On April 4, 1979, the third custody
hearing between the parties was held in Rhode Island at which
"physical possession" of the child was transferred from the mother
to the father. The mother later claimed that she had not been notified
of either the hearing or the change of custody.
Yet within two weeks, in mid-April, 1979, the mother, stepfather,
and child moved to Louisiana. During the same month, procedural
developments in Rhode Island culminated in a kidnapping warrant for
the mother's arrest. On June 6, 1979, on the strength of that war-
rant, the mother was arrested by parish authorities but was subse-
quently released. Five days later,1"1 she filed a rule in the Louisiana
district court for a change of custody; the trial judge overruled the
exception to jurisdiction and then awarded custody of the child to
the mother.
The fourth circuit first considered whether Louisiana possessed
jurisdiction under the UCCJA. Since the child had been within the
state for only two months when the mother's action was filed, the
conclusion is inescapable that home state jurisdiction was nonexistent.
However, the court tortured the significant connection basis to af-
firm that Louisiana had jurisdiction over the dispute. The panel ma-
jority discounted the facts that the child had lived elsewhere for almost
all of the five-plus years of his life, that the father and his family
continued to reside in Rhode Island, and that all potential disinterested
(nonrelated) witnesses to the pre-existing Hadley family interactions
lived in Rhode Island.
Just how far the majority was willing to go to afford the mother
130. 394 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 622 (La. 1981).
131. Id. at 776 (Samuel, J., dissenting).
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the protection of a Louisiana forum is demonstrated by the following
passage from its opinion:
At the time of trial, the husband was working and the family
was living in Chalmette, Louisiana in a rented house with plans
to build their own. Eric, who was six years old at the time
of the trial in St. Bernard, had just begun school in that parish.
Denise's parents had also moved from Massachusetts and were
living in New Orleans. One of Denise's brothers and his wife
had also moved to Louisiana with their daughter. A younger
brother and his wife were contemplating moving from New
England to this state.132
The clear inference from the court's language is that no member of
the family, nuclear or extended, had any connection with Louisiana
at the commencement of this action, which is the critical point under
the UCCJA for the jurisdictional determination. 13
On the fact pattern of the Hadley case, it is difficult to justify
the finding of significant connection jurisdiction in Louisiana consis-
tent with the limited use of this jurisdictional base envisioned by the
UCCJA.' Even more troubling is the fourth circuit's failure to follow
the analytical requirements for modification jurisdiction under the
UCCJA and the model Moore decision of the second circuit. The Loui-
siana action in Hadley was for modification of an out-of-state (Rhode
Island) decree, which required the court to find both that Rhode Island
did not have jurisdiction, and that Louisiana did have jurisdiction.
Under the criteria set forth in the Act, there were potentially
132. Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
133. See supra note 55. The hearing on the jurisdictional challenge was not held
until February 6, 1980, some seven months after the action was initiated. 394 So. 2d
at 770. It should be noted that according to section 24 of the UCCJA: "Upon the re-
quest of a party to a custody proceeding which raises a question of existence or exer-
cise of jurisdiction under this Act the case shall be given calendar priority and hand-
led expeditiously." 9 U.L.A. 168 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1723 (1983)]. The speedy determina-
tion of jurisdictional challenges can minimize the temptation to consider developments
occurring after the commencement of the action as relevant or competent jurisdic-
tional evidence. In addition, as the commissioners' note to section 24 of the UCCJA
observes:
Judicial time spent in determining which court has or should exercise
jurisdiction often prolongs the period of uncertainty and turmoil in a child's
life more than is necessary. The need for speedy adjudication exists, of course,
with respect to all aspects of child custody litigation. The priority require-
ment is limited to jurisdictional questions because an all encompassing priority
would be beyond the scope of this Act.
9 U.L.A. 16869 (1968).
134. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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two other states with jurisdiction in the Hadley case. Rhode Island,
the state of initial decree rendition, clearly seems to have qualified
for significant connection jurisdiction in view of the child's having
spent five years of his life there; indeed, it was the only state where
he had lived for any sustained period. It is also quite possible that
Massachusetts had acquired home state jurisdiction under the Act.135
In failing to consider whether any state other than Louisiana had an
equal or paramount claim to jurisdiction over the continuing parental
controversies, Hadley confuses the issue to be decided on the merits
with the issue of which court should do the deciding. The case holds
in effect that it is proper to exercise significant connection power
whenever it is "in the best interests of the child." Clearly, the assump-
tion underlying the entire jurisdictional plan of the UCCJA is that
only courts authorized according to the Act's prioritized scheme are
likely to arrive at the correct decision about what is, on the merits,
in the best interests of the child. Although the significant connection
provision is the only jurisdictional standard which expressly mentions
"the best interests of the child," the phrase is clearly used in the
statute as a limitation rather than as a license for freely taking
jurisdiction. Only when the Act is obeyed in its interlocking entirety,
including the prerequisite of optimal connections with the forum, are
the best interests of the child served according to the overall pur-
poses of the Act.
Cata v. McKnight3' is one of the more curious appellate cases
applying the UCCJA. The Louisiana second circuit cited and ap-
parently followed the erroneous Hadley model of the fourth circuit
and wholly ignored its own superior construct which had been
developed in Moore v. Moore."7 In Cata, the Louisiana proceedings
began with an action for enforcement of an out-of-state decree which
was met with a reconventional demand for modification of the decree.
In this case, the family originally lived in Oklahoma. In September
of 1980, the father moved with his two children from Oklahoma to
Louisiana. Although the Oklahoma court had rendered a custody
decree in the father's favor prior to his departure, the court had also
issued a restraining order prohibiting him from removing the children
from the state. The restraining order was issued in response to the
mother's petition for modification of the original decree.
135. The opinion omits the critical fact of when the child was moved from Rhode
Island to Massachusetts.
136. 401 So. 2d 1221 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. granted, 404 So. 2d 264 (La. 1981).
137. 379 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980). Two of the three members of the
panels in both Cata and Moore were Judges Hall and Marvin.
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Three months after the move to Louisiana, the Oklahoma court
awarded the mother permanent custody of the two children. She then
followed the father to Louisiana and petitioned the court for enforce-
ment of her new decree. The father answered with a challenge to
the new decree and asked the Louisiana court to change custody. The
trial court declined to exercise jurisdiction in this case and ordered
a stay of the Louisiana proceeding, allowing the father fifteen days
in which to file his action in the proper Oklahoma court."3 8
The court of appeal's analysis of the jurisdictional issues in Cata
is troublesome for several reasons. First, the court boldly asserted,
without any factual discussion or analysis, that it had significant con-
nection jurisdiction. However, at the time the action was filed in Loui-
siana, the father and children had been in Louisiana only three months
and had left Oklahoma in violation of Oklahoma's restraining order.13
The opinion in Cata gives no inkling of any evidence on the record
which would bear upon the children's family, schooling, community
integration or other factors which might establish a significant con-
nection with Louisiana. In fact, upon its face, the finding of Louisiana
jurisdiction seems to violate the Act's "mere presence" rule. '
The second troublesome feature of Cata, is that once the court
had mistakenly assumed jurisdiction, it repeated the Hadley court's
error by failing to address the modification jurisdiction issue. The court
bypassed the second inquiry required by the Act, specifically, whether
jurisdiction still existed in Oklahoma. Had the court followed the Act,
it would have ultimately reached the same correct conclusion albeit
by way of the correct analysis.
As it was, the court deferred to Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:1706,"' and decided that Louisiana was an inconvenient forum in
which to litigate this case. Although that finding was arguably cor-
rect, the inconvenient forum consideration is not a substitute for deter-
mining whether the power to modify exists under Revised Statutes
13:1713."4 As a matter of doctrinal logic, only a court with power to
138. The second circuit initially denied supervisory writs, but the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for "a hearing and decision on the merits." 404 So. 2d
264 (La. 1981). The second circuit construed this mandate to call for a decision on
the "jurisdictional merits." 401 So. 2d at 1222.
139. There is no mention in the Cata opinion of the "clean hands" provision of
the UCCJA. See infra text accompanying notes 173-75.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
141. [UCCJA S 7, 9 U.L.A. 137-38 (1968)].
142. [UCCJA S 14, 9 U.L.A. 153-54 (1968)]. For further discussion of inconvenient
forum analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 181-89.
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decide can ever reach the question of whether it would be convenient
to exercise that power. Fabricating jurisdiction, even when the court
thereafter refuses to exercise it, is a questionable practice not only
because it offends the niceties of a doctrinal syllogism but also, as
will be discussed in more detail below, because it invites unjustified,
duplicative, and expensive litigation.
In fact, what may have been troubling to the Louisiana courts
in both Hadley and Cata was a suspicion that the sister state's
modification of its original decree and abrupt switching of custody
were "punitive." A "punitive decree" is a judgment not premised upon
the child's best interests but, instead, aimed at punishing a parent
for having left the State or for having failed to appear to litigate
the merits."' Just what credit is due punitive child custody judgments
is an issue which has badly divided American jurisdictions, but some
states refuse to honor them." Nevertheless, the legislatures of states
which have adopted the Act have presumably directed their own
courts not to fabricate jurisdiction simply because a foreign state's
decree appears punitive. Instead, the UCCJA directs aggrieved par-
ties to seek redress in the state which rendered the suspect decree.
The modification actions presented in Moore, Hadley and Cata were
all brought by the custodial parent who had recently moved with the
child to Louisiana. While either the custodial or the noncustodial
parent may seek relief from the terms of a now chafing initial decree,
more often than not it is the noncustodial parent who either initiates
relitigation or precipitates it by provocative conduct. The overwhelm-
ing majority of initial custody judgments still result in the denomina-
tion of one parent as the child's "legal custodian," while the other
parent retains only vestiges of the authority and access enjoyed before
the family unit was dissolved. 45 Such vestigial parenting (composed
primarily of consultation and visitation rights) can be a very
143. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fox v. Webster, 151 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963),
cert. dismissed, 162 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). However,
the dissenting judge there observed: "It is my view that a respect for law is an essen-
tial qualification for one seeking custody of a child." 151 So. 2d at 17 (Pearson, C.J.,
dissenting).
144. For a collection of cases and further discussion, see Bodenheimer, supra note
25, at 1003-09.
145. Many states like Louisiana have now enacted "Joint Custody" statutes. See
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 146, 157; Comment, Joint Custody in Louisiana, 43 LA. L. REV. 99-101
(1982). Whether or not such statutes actually decrease acrimony is, of course, a mat-
ter of continuing debate. Compare J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 37-38 (1973) with Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of
Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 523 (1979).
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frustrating role for the noncustodian, often leading to acts in defiance
of an initial decree or to proceedings to modify what is perceived as
an intolerable initial judgment.
For example, in Buchanan v. Malone,"8 the father gave notice to
the custodian-mother that he would not return the children at the
end of their summer visitation in Louisiana; subsequently, he filed
an action in Louisiana to modify the Washington custody decree.
Similarly, in Hust v. Whitehead,"7 the non-custodial father went to
Texas and took possession of his children from their grandmother in
whose temporary care the mother had left them; he returned with
the children to Louisiana and, three days later, filed for a modifica-
tion of the Texas decree.
A parent who takes possession of his child in violation of a custody
decree is rarely motivated by anything other than genuine concern
for the child. Thus, such conduct is often known by the somewhat
gentler term of "childnapping" or "child snatching" to distinguish it
from kidnapping, the wrongful taking of a child for mistreatment or
profit."8 Yet, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has observed that the "simple fact is that each state's
capacity to ignore the enforcement of other state's decrees, and to
modify them, created a legal climate favoring forum-shopping, seize
and run tactics between custody contestants, and aggravated pro-
longed litigations.""' 9 In large measure, this type of parental miscon-
duct inspired the promulgation of the UCCJA. 5° Furthermore, deter-
rence of childnapping is clearly the purpose underlying Revised
Statutes 13:1707,"' the so-called "clean hands" limitation,'52 which is
one of the most powerful restraints upon the exercise of jurisdiction
under the Act.
The "Clean Hands" Limitation Upon an Exercise of Jurisdiction
At the outset, three important points need be made about the
operation of the "clean hands" limitation under the Act. First, and
146. 415 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
147. 416 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
148. It should be noted, however, that the United States Congress expressly declared
its intent to have "childnapping" considered a federal crime. Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, S 10(a), 94 Stat. 3566, 3573; see 18 U.S.C.
S 1073 (1976).
149. Brief amici curiae, supra note 4, at 9.
150. See UCCJA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 113 (1968).
151. [UCCJA S 8, 9 U.L.A. 142 (1968)].
152. The labeling arises out of a discussion by Professor Albert Ehrenzweig in
his article cited supra note 1, at 357.
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perhaps most important, a consideration of a parent's alleged miscon-
duct under this provision is appropriate only after a trial forum deter-
mines that it in fact possesses either initial jurisdiction or modifica-
tion jurisdiction. Second, although more frequently the "clean hands"
limitation arises in the course of an action to modify a decree, it also
restrains the exercise of initial jurisdiction. Third, this limitation ap-
plies to a broad category of misconduct committed by either the
custodial or the non-custodial parent.
The first point, the necessity for jurisdiction, would seem to be
obvious; however, apparently there remains some confusion on this
issue among Louisiana courts."' Gibson v. Gibson" is an excellent ex-
ample of a proper recognition of this threshold issue, despite poig-
nant facts including childnapping by both parents. In Gibson, the hus-
band moved to Louisiana leaving behind his wife and infant daughter
in Virginia. Some seventeen months later, he returned to Virginia on
Christmas Eve and "watched the residence of [his wife] for an undeter-
mined length of time."'5 After obtaining his wife's permission to take
the child shopping on Christmas Day, the husband instead returned
with the child to Louisiana. He sought custody from a Louisiana court,
and the wife sought custody from a Virginia court. Ignoring the pend-
ing Virginia action, the Louisiana trial court took jurisdiction and
awarded custody to the husband. Thereafter on some undisclosed date,
the wife retaliated by snatching the child back in defiance of the Loui-
siana decree.
The third circuit disposed of what appears to be a complex legal
tangle by the simple determination that Louisiana lacked initial
jurisdiction to hear the dispute under the Act's criteria. Consequently,
there was no need to reach the issue of whether the "clean hands"
proviso would direct that jurisdiction be declined.
Subsection A of Revised Statutes 13:1707 governs the applicabil-
ity of the limitation to initial custody decree jurisdiction. Subsection
A provides that a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction when a
petitioner for an initial decree wrongfully removes a child from a state
or engages in "similar reprehensible conduct."'' 5 The commissioners'
153. In both Losey v. Losey, 412 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982), and Buchanan
v. Malone, 415 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982), the trial courts declined to exercise
jurisdiction for reason of misconduct under LA. R.S. 13:1707 [UCCJA S 8, 9 U.L.A. 142
(1968)] without deciding the threshold question of whether or not jurisdiction was
possessed under the UCCJA.
154. 429 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
155. Id. at 878.
156. [Id. S 8(a)].
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note explains that, under this subsection, which applies only where
there is no existing custody decree, "wrongfully taking" does not mean
that a legal right has been violated. Rather, "wrongfully taking" means
that "one party's conduct is so objectionable that a court in the exer-
cise of its inherent equity powers cannot in good conscience permit
that party access to its jurisdiction."'157
An illustration of the proper application of this restraint in the
context of pre-decree conduct of a parent is Losey v. Losey."8 When
the father was mustered out of the military, he moved to Louisiana,
but the mother elected to remain with the children in their family
home in Delaware. Shortly after the move, the father returned to
Delaware on two occasions in order to remove both children from their
home and to move them to Louisiana. Within the month, the father
filed a petition for custody in the Louisiana trial court."' The trial
court ultimately concluded that it would decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion because the father had brought the children to Louisiana under
"less than satisfactory" circumstances.' 6 In its independent review of
the record, the court of appeal found that there was ample evidence
to support the conclusion that the father had wrongfully removed the
children from their home in Delaware.
Subsection B of Revised Statutes 13:1707.61 is directed at a parent
who violates the terms of an existing decree.
Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall
not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of
another state if the petitioner, without the consent of the per-
son entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from
the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has
improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary
relinquishment of physical custody. If the petitioner has
violated any other provision of a custody decree .... the court
may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and pro-
per under the circumstances.
Thus, the Act distinguishes between what may be termed presump-
tively improper conduct -abductions and retentions-and less serious
types of judgment violations. In Hust V. Whitehead,' despite widely
157. UCCJA S 8, commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 143 (1968).
158. 412 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
159. For a discussion of Louisiana's jurisdiction in the matter, see supra text ac-
companying notes 82-92.
160. 412 So. 2d at 641.
161. [UCCJA S 8(b), 9 U.L.A. 142 (1968)].
162. 416 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
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divergent accounts of the means of removal of the children from Texas
to Louisiana, the trial court found that the father had abducted the
children. After hearing evidence the trial court dismissed the father's
action for modification on this basis, as well as on a finding that Loui-
siana was "a most inconvenient forum.""1 3 Buchanan v. Malone""4 is
an example of an improper retention after the end of a decreed visita-
tion period; however, neither the trial nor the appellate court
definitively ruled upon the jurisdictional issue.165
In acknowledging the "clean hands" limitation on jurisdiction, other
states have reached results similar to those in the Hust decision. In
Craighead v. Davis,' a Georgia court was faced with a petition for
modification by a father who had wrongfully brought his child to that
state two months earlier. The child involved had lived in Florida for
five years before his father abducted him; the court held that two
months was an insufficient length of time in which to establish the
significant connections required by the Act. The court further stated
that even if jurisdiction existed, the court would decline its exercise
due to the policy that Georgia would not provide a forum for a non-
custodial parent who improperly removes a child from the possession
of a custodial parent.
Even Florida courts, which have historically been unusually will-
ing to accept jurisdiction after childnappings, 7 have strictly construed
the UCCJA's "clean hands" limitation. In Brown v. Tan,' a mother
was visited by her child, who resided in Singapore with his father.
At the end of the two-week visitation period, the mother petitioned
the Florida court for a change of custody, informing the father of her
intention to retain physical possession of the child. The court found
that there was insufficient contact with Florida for its courts to assert
jurisdiction because the child had resided in Singapore for twelve
years, visiting Florida only infrequently. The court further found that,
even if there were jurisdiction, the mother's act of retaining the child
163. The appellate court bypassed the "clean hands" issue by affirming the refusal
to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of LA. R.S. 13:1706(G) [UCCJA S 7(g), 9 U.L.A. 138
(1968)], the inconvenient forum section.
164. 415 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
165. Instead, the appellate court simply held that even after the adoption of the
UCCJA, a habeas corpus petition is an appropriate pleading to enforce a foreign decree
of custody in this state. Although the opinion is not without ambiguity, apparently
the court also approved the refusal of modification jurisdiction where the trial court
finds that there has been an improper retention by a noncustodian. See id. at 264.
166. 162 Ga. App. 145, 290 S.E.2d 358 (1982).
167. R. CROUCH, supra note 25, at 20.
168. 395 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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was wrongful, and the court should decline jurisdiction in any case.169
Violations of decree provisions which fall short of abductions or im-
proper retentions of a child are subject to a less stringent standard
for declining jurisdiction under Revised Statutes 13:1707.17' The com-
missioners' note states that the most common use of this power will
occur when the custodial parent removes a child in order to frustrate
the noncustodial parent's visitation rights. Refusal to exercise jurisdic-
tion was made discretionary for this type of conduct "because it
depends on the circumstances whether non-compliance with the court
order is serious enough to warrant the drastic sanction of denial of
jurisdiction."M'
Both Hadley v. Hadley172 and Cata v. McKnight7 ' are Louisiana
examples of this type of parental misconduct. In both cases, by com-
ing to Louisiana, the custodial parent violated outstanding orders of
restraint issued by the courts of a sister state. In both cases, the
result was the dangerous combination of an assertion of the highly
discretionary significant connection jurisdiction and an invocation of
the optional portion of the "clean hands" limitation.
Assuming the Louisiana courts had jurisdiction in Hadley and
Cata,17' declining to exercise it in both cases under the "clean hands"
limitation ¢would have been well within the trial courts' discretion.
Hadley stands alone in a group of similar cases from other jurisdic-
tions in both finding and exercising jurisdiction despite such parental
misconduct.1 7 1
169. See also Pabst v. McElfresh, 410 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (per
curiam) (ordered the return of the child to the custodian; decision based upon Brown).
170. [UCCJA S 8, 9 U.L.A. 142 (1968)].
171. UCCJA S 8, commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 143 (1968).
172. 394 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 622 (La. 1981).
173. 401 So. 2d 1221 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. granted, 404 So. 2d 264 (La. 1981).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 130-42. Although yet to arise in Louisiana,
an equally serious problem erupts when the wrongful conduct of a custodian or non-
custodian such as childnapping results in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the forum
state, for example, by succeeding in keeping the child for six months. The courts of
several states are split on the question of whether to exercise jurisdiction in this situa-
tion. See In re Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1981); Brauch v.
Shaw, 121 N.H. 562, 432 A.2d 1 (1981), for cases in which jurisdiction was exercised;
Blosser v. Blosser, 2 Ark. App. 37, 616 S.W.2d 29 (1981); Kumar v. Superior Court,
32 Cal. 3d 689, 652 P.2d 1003, 186 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982); In re Johnson, 634 P.2d 1034
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Flesner v. Houser, 104 Ill. App. 3d 904, 433 N.E.2d 720 (1982),
for cases in which jurisdiction was declined.
175. See Rodriguez v. Saucedo, 3 Ark. App. 42, 621 S.W.2d 874 (1981); Woodhouse
v. District Court, 196 Colo. 558, 587 P.2d 1199 (1978); Young v. District Ct., 194 Colo.
140, 570 P.2d 249 (1977); Zuccaro v. Zuccaro, 407 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
[Vol. 44
19831 UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT 57
As an added deterrent to the "reprehensible conduct" proscribed
by the "clean hands" jurisdictional limitation, subsection C of Revised
Statutes 13:170717 authorizes the trial court to assess costs against
the petitioner for such an abuse of process. In Hust, the custodian
mother submitted evidence that she had incurred substantial costs
in having to travel to Louisiana to defend the modification action and
to regain the possession of the children. The appellate court affirmed
her right to indemnification from the father. Under section 8 of the
UCCJA, reimbursable expenses include "necessary travel and other
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their
witnesses."177 The second circuit correctly ruled in Hust that the trial
court may assess such costs even when it finds it lacks jurisdiction
to determine the merits of the custody dispute: the assessment of
costs is targeted most appropriately at actions in which jurisdiction
is patently lacking. In Huston v. Granstaff,78 the third circuit proper-
ly assessed all litigation costs occasioned by the non-custodian parent's
conduct. In Huston, the mother received reimbursement not only for
her challenge to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana trial court but also
for the costs necessary to enforce her Texas decree.
Finally, it must be observed that Revised Statutes 13:1707(B)"9
makes the decision under the "clean hands" limitation subject to the
overriding proviso "[u]nless required in the interest of the child." This
language is a potential invitation to territoriality under the guise of
child protection. In deciding whether to seize upon such enabling
language of the UCCJA, a state court should recall that a liberal use
would defeat a major purpose of the Act: the deterrence of "unilateral
removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards."''
Matthews v. Matthews, 238 Ga. 201, 232 S.E.2d 76 (1977); Clark v. Clark, 67 A.D.2d
388, 416 N.Y.S.2d 330 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 706, 417 N.Y.S.2d 1027
(1979); Ruff v. Ruff, 98 Misc. 2d 934, 415 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Fam. Ct. 1979); Inn v. Inn,
93 Misc. 2d 1110, 404 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Fan. Ct. 1978). In none of these cases was jurisdic-
tion found to exist, and most appellate courts stated it would not be exercised in
any case due to parental misconduct. In Cata, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of
Appeals approved a finding of jurisdiction but refused its exercise not because of peti-
tioner's "unclean hands" but because Louisiana-was an inconvenient forum. See supra
text accompanying notes 138-42.
176. [UCCJA S 8(c), 9 U.L.A. 142 (1968)].
177. LA. R.S. 13:1707(C) (1983) [UCCJA S 8(c), 9 U.L.A. 142 (1968)].
178. 417 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). For a description of the taxed parent's
conduct, see supra note 112.
179. [UCCJA S 8(b), 9 U.L.A. 142 (1968)].
180. LA. R.S. 13:1700(A)(5) (1983) [UCCJA S 1(a)(5), 9 U.L.A. 117 (1968)]; see LA. R.S.
13:1706(C)(5) (1983) [UCCJA S 7(c)(5), 9 U.L.A. 138 (1968)].
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The Inconvenient Forum Limitation
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1706,181 the statutory embodiment
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is a potent element of the
UCCJA and deserves separate consideration. It allows a forum with
UCCJA jurisdiction to decline to exercise its power on the basis that
it is an inconvenient forum and that another more appropriate forum
exists. This decision is entirely discretionary; it depends upon the
weighing of circumstances according to five suggested criteria. Even
so, it is an essential step in the UCCJA process: a forum first deter-
mines whether it has authority; if and only if it has jurisdiction does
a forum then consider whether it is the most appropriate court to
hear the dispute.
This provision is broader than the doctrine of forum non conveniens
which has taken root in the jurisprudence of many states. It places the
question of the appropriateness of the forum sequentially between the
determination of the existence of jurisdiction and the decision regarding
its exercise.'82 Nonetheless, some courts have failed to make this crucial
distinction. The result is that the courts bypass the initial jurisdictional
inquiry, basing upon inconvenient forum grounds decisions which should
be based on jurisdictional grounds.
A Louisiana case which demonstrates this error is Cata v.
McKnight.' At the time the mother brought her action in the Loui-
siana courts to enforce her Oklahoma custody decree, the father and
children had been living in this state about three months, with no
apparent previous contacts here. Both the district court and the ap-
pellate court simply presumed, without examining the facts, that
jurisdiction existed in this case. As has been previously discussed,
Louisiana rather clearly lacked jurisdiction in the Cata case.'84 The
conclusion in Cata that Louisiana should not intervene rested, however,
on the court's interpretation of the inconvenient forum provision of
the Act.
The application of the inconvenient forum test by the court in
181. [UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. 137-38 (1968)].
182. R. CROUCH, supra note 25, at 19.
183. 401 So. 2d 1221 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. granted, 405 So. 2d 264 (La. 1981).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 136-42. According to the court of appeals,
the "district court found the Oklahoma decree to be valid and refused applicant's pro-
testations to the contrary and his attempt to have the court exercise jurisdiction under
UCCJA law." 401 So. 2d at 1222 (emphasis added). The court went on to say that
it was "clear" that Louisiana had jurisdiction over this action because the children
and father were "now living" in the state. Id. Thus, the question of the existence
of jurisdiction was nearly pretermitted.
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Cata followed exactly the format set out in the Act. Subsection C
of Revised Statutes 13:1706181 delineates five factors, among others,
to be used in making this determination.
(1) If another state is or recently was the child's home state.
(2) If another state has a closer connection with the child and
his family or with the child and one or more of the contestants.
(3) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is
more readily available in another state.
(4) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no
less appropriate, and
(5) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this State
would contravene any of the purposes stated in Section 1700.
The Cata court's conclusion that Louisiana was an inconvenient forum
followed straightforwardly from a correct application of these five
tests. However, the Cata court should never have proceeded to an
application of the inconvenient forum tests since it lacked jurisdic-
tion in the first place.
There are good reasons why the convenience question should not
substitute for a correct threshold determination of whether the court
can properly take significant connection jurisdiction. The Act's limita-
tions on jurisdiction were intended to interdict needless and expen-
sive conflicts between states and the resulting doubling of litigation
costs to the parties. The convenient forum provisions were designed
to serve much the same ends. The convenience tests, however, are
highly discretionary. If the court in Cata, for example, had decided
that Louisiana was not an inconvenient place for the litigation, its
decision could be contested only on the ground of abuse of discretion.
Were it to become accepted that a local court can fabricate initial
jurisdiction, parties hoping for "home-town justice" might well be
tempted to commence the very tenuous actions in a forum which the
Act was designed to deny them. Such parties might well simply trust
their luck that they can persuade an appellate court to sustain a
parochial trial judge's discretionary ruling that his court was the con-
venient forum as well.
Other states have had similar problems divining the proper in-
terplay of jurisdiction and its exercise under the inconvenient forum
limitation. In In re Wonderly," the Ohio Supreme Court engaged in
much the same type of analysis, finding that, although the children
185. [UCCJA S 7(c), 9 U.LA. 137-38 (1968)].
186. 67 Ohio St. 2d 178, 423 N.E.2d 420 (1981).
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had been absent from the state for nine years, the court could still
assert significant connection jurisdiction. The lion's share of the opin-
ion, however, addressed the question of whether the forum was con-
venient. The court ultimately determined the custody litigation should
take place in Indiana, the state of the children's residence. Thus, the
question of existence of jurisdiction was improperly analyzed in terms
of forum appropriateness, a weapon which should be reserved for the
question of whether existing jurisdiction should be exercised."8 7
The court's option to declare itself an inconvenient forum should
be an added, independent deterrent to forum shopping and child snatch-
ing. However, the option is just that - optional- and therein lies
the problem. A court which finds itself inconvenient need not
necessarily defer to another state, and very few courts will go as far
as did the Alaska Supreme Court, in Rexford v. Rexford,' in upholding
the letter and spirit of the Act. In Rexford, a mother moved with
her child to California, and after only eight days, petitioned that state's
court for a custody decree. The California court promptly began a
custody investigation, which was in progress when the father filed
his action in Alaska. Clearly, as the extended home state, Alaska could
have asserted jurisdiction over this controversy. However, the
Supreme Court of Alaska found that the policies of the UCCJA were
so strong that the court should follow the alternate route of coopera-
tion and defer to California."9
The Louisiana cases discussed in this article were all decided under
the aegis of the UCCJA and illustrate some of the unavoidable am-
biguities produced by its design. In the near future, however, the
assessment of the UCCJA's inherent effectiveness in minimizing in-
terstate custody conflicts will be clouded due to the interaction and
impact of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980.
IV. THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT OF 1980
There is some evidence in Congressional history to indicate that
187. See also Szmyd v. Szmyd, 641 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1982); Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan.
App. 2d 284, 615 P.2d 806 (1980); Warman v. Warman, 294 Pa. Super. 285, 439 A.2d
1203 (1982), for equally troublesome decisions on this point.
188. 631 P.2d 475 (Alaska 1980).
189. The court relied on sections regarding inconvenient forum and pending pro-
ceedings in other states, as well as the purposes of the Act. At the same time, the
court noted that mere passage of time does not vest jurisdiction in the new state
after a child-snatching and that cooperation with the new state's investigators does
not waive the jurisdiction of the home state.
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the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA)1'1 was pro-
mulgated only to spur universal adoption of the UCCJA and that
ultimately the federal act might be repealed, leaving the UCCJA ex-
clusively to control once more the resolution of issues under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. As Senator Wallop, the prime mover behind
the PKPA observed during its debate:
This provision does not mandate a state to adopt the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. It should serve, however, as
a significant inducement to the 11 states and the District of
Columbia which have yet to adopt the Uniform Act, since by
doing so their custody and visitation decrees would then be
entitled to be recognized, enforced and not modified by sister
states. The most important immediate result of this provision
will be the eradication of the so-called "havenstate" in which
an abductor parent can still find refuge. Even those states
will be required to enforce the decrees of sister states that
have adopted the Uniform Act. . . . Of course, once all the
states and the District of Columbia have enacted the law, we
should then reassess the scope and usefulness of the federal
law. 19 1
This federal legislation was enacted in the face of increasing incidences
of childnapping and forum shopping by parents, combined with an ap-
parent lack of preventive power on the part of the UCCJA.
The PKPA is really an extraordinary legislative event. For the
first time since 1804,11 Congress used its delegated power to "prescribe
the manner" in which "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State."'93
In defining the criteria required to support a judgment entitled
to full faith and credit, the PKPA incorporates verbatim the four
jurisdictional bases established by Section 3 of the UCCJA,' M although
the federal statute requires certain additional considerations. However,
190. 28 U.S.C. S 1738A (Supp. V 1981).
191. Addendum to Joint Hearing, supra note 23, at 139-40.
192. Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C.
SS 1738-1739 (1976)). For an account of how little is known about the genesis of the
full faith and credit clause, see Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause
of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945).
193. U.S. CONST. art. IV, S 1.
194. Compare 28 U.S.C. 1738A(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981) with UCCJA S 3(a), 9 U.L.A.
122 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702(A) (1983)].
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
as will be later discussed in some detail, by making three important
curative changes in the UCCJA design, the PKPA reconfigures the
decision-making process which governs jurisdictional questions now
and in the foreseeable future.
As a general proposition, unlike the UCCJA, the federal statute
is not a grant of jurisdiction under particular circumstances. However,
in the sense that a custody decree rendered outside its framework
is not entitled to recognition and enforcement by sister states, the
PKPA may be said to federalize the UCCJA. The result of this com-
bination is that a court must determine the existence of its jurisdic-
tion under the UCCJA,"' and then look to the federal act to deter-
mine whether the exercise of that jurisdiction will entitle the resulting
decree to recognition. 9
The major impact of the PKPA falls upon three problem areas:
cases involving a question of another state's pending proceedings,
jurisdiction in initial custody actions, and continuing jurisdiction. In
these areas particularly, the PKPA has attempted to cure the defects
found in the UCCJA, principally by removing a great deal of discre-
tion afforded trial courts.
Required Deference to Pending Proceedings
It should be remembered that in drafting the UCCJA the com-
missioners sought, among other goals, to avoid the spectre of
simultaneous custody proceedings in more than one state. Conse-
quently, section 6(a) of the UCCJA provides:
A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under
this Act if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding con-
cerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of
another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity
with this Act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court
of the other state .... 17
The phrase "substantially in conformity with this Act" lacks precise
definition and has provided courts with a means of justifying refusal
to defer to existing proceedings in other states for any number of
reasons. It is unclear under what circumstances this restriction
precludes action by a court. Perhaps the intent of the drafters was
to constrain a court only when the then pending foreign action does
195. In the cases of Texas and Massachusetts, the state law is applied since neither
has adopted the UCCJA. Supra note 4 and accompanying text.
196. Coombs, supra note 25.
197. 9 U.L.A. 134 (1968) (emphasis added) [LA. R.S. 13:1705(A) (1983)].
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not conform to one of the four fundamental jurisdictional requisites
enumerated in section 3;..8 on the other hand, a pending foreign ac-
tion which violates any of the mandatory provisions (such as the re-
quirement of notice)'99 or discretionary provisions (such as a deter-
mination of the convenience of the forum).. of the UCCJA could be
considered sufficient to serve the same purpose, i.e., avoidance of
deference to sister state courts. In short, the UCCJA seems to pro-
vide a court with the discretion to choose the very basis on which
it will evaluate the performance of other courts."0 '
The federal act closes this loophole by adopting the most restric-
tive of the above interpretations, 2 ' and it mandates deference to any
court which has taken valid initial jurisdiction or which has retained
jurisdiction under the continuing jurisdiction provision of the PKPA.0 '
By making application of this section depend entirely upon federal
rather than state law, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
effectively removes the major sources of discretion found in the
UCCJA."4 Rather than finding that a court of another state is exer-
cising jurisdiction substantially in accordance with the myriad provi-
sions of the UCCJA, the forum must now find that there is no pro-
ceeding in any other state which comports with the federal statute.
Required Deference to Home State Jurisdiction
As has been demonstrated earlier,' one of the major weaknesses
of the UCCJA stems from its scheme of concurrent jurisdiction. While
the courts of one state may assert jurisdiction on a home state basis,
198. 9 U.L.A. 122 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1702 (1983)].
199. UCCJA SS 4, 6(a), 8(b), 13-14, 9 U.L.A. 129, 134, 142, 151, 153-54 (1968) [LA.
R.S. 13:1703, :1705(A), :1707(B), :1712-:1713 (1983)], respectively.
200. UCCJA SS 7, 8(a), 9 U.L.A. 137-38, 142 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1706, :1707(A) (1983)],
respectively.
201. See, e.g., Allison v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 993, 160 Cal. Rptr. 309
(1979); Lopez v. District Ct., 199 Colo. 207, 606 P.2d 853 (1980) (only nonconformity
with the jurisdictional bases in section 3 will suffice to excuse deference); Brokus v.
Brokus, 420 N.E.2d 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129,
581 P.2d 91 (1978) (nonconformity with any mandatory provision will suffice). State
courts have in fact adopted each of these alternative constructions of this phrase.
202. 28 U.S.C. S 1738A(g) (Supp. V 1981).
203. The mention of these three major changes made by the PKPA is not meant
to imply that there are not others; however, they are predominantly semantic in nature,
and will have more minor impact. For a fuller dicussion, see Coombs, supra note 25.
204. Even though the PKPA greatly restricts discretion, no law can eliminate all
possibilities of abuse. For an elaborate example of a loophole potentially left open
by the PKPA, see id. at 786-88.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
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the courts of another state may at the same time assert jurisdiction
on a significant connection basis. The results are competing jurisdic-
tion and potentially conflicting decrees. To rectify this problem, the
PKPA mandates deference by the significant connection court to the
home state court by requiring that full faith and credit be given
judgments of significant connection courts only if it appears that no
other state would have jurisdiction under the home state jurisdictional
base.206
The basic federal rule-that the winner of a valid race to the
courthouse determines where the case will be heard-is thus subject
to an important qualification. If the winner of the race is relying on
significant connection jurisdiction, he may still lose to a later-filing
contestant who chooses to litigate in the child's home state. The
message is clear: if a state wants to ensure that its custody decrees
will be honored by sister states, its claim to jurisdiction must be
founded on either the home state or emergency basis; significant con-
nection claims will be honored only if there is no state qualifying as
the home state.
The Eicke case is an excellent example of the anomaly produced
by the UCCJA which the federal act attempts to remedy by man-
dating deference to the home state. In Eicke, the mother and children
had resided in Louisiana only two months at the time the mother
filed her petition for custody. Without justification for using the
emergency jurisdictional basis, the court's only option lay in assert-
ing significant connection jurisdiction; Texas was still the home state.
If the federal act had been in force at the time the Eicke case arose,. 7
Louisiana would have been required to defer to Texas for at least
the remainder of the six month period during which Texas yet re-
tained home state jurisdiction over the custody dispute. Consequently,
the resulting initial Louisiana decree was premature and would not
have been entitled to full faith and credit under the PKPA.
The "Continuing Jurisdiction" Limitation on Modifiability
The combined mechanisms of the UCCJA and the PKPA affect
not only the determination of which forum has initial decree jurisdic-
tion but also the determination of which forum has jurisdiction to
modify a prior custody judgment. The analytical. litany traditionally
used by the United States Supreme Court is that only final judgments
are entitled to enforcement under the full faith and credit clause;
206. 28 U.S.C. S 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1981).
207. See supra note 102.
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whatever the state of rendition may do to alter its decrees, a sister
state may do as well when presented with a foreign judgment." Since
child custody decrees are universally modifiable by the state of ren-
dition upon a showing of changed conditions," 9 most states have held
that a custody judgment does not command enforcement, but, instead,
may be modified by any sister state. In fact, Justice Frankfurter has
stated that, in his view, the Supreme Court should expressly exempt
all child custody decrees from the command of the full faith and credit
clause.210
The third significant change made by the PKPA concerns the issue
of an initial decree court's continuing custody jurisdiction over subse-
quent litigation involving the same child. Under the UCCJA, state
A, a potential forum for modification, is precluded from acting if, at
the time the petition is filed, the courts of state B retain jurisdiction
under the highly discretionary standards set forth in section 3 of the
UCCJA. Although the PKPA incorporates and thus federalizes this
section of the UCCJA,212 it also adds a new dimension by providing
that state B has continuing jurisdiction as follows:
(d) the jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a
child custody determination consistently with the provisions
of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsec-
tion (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State
remains the residence of the child or of any contestant. 3
Subsection (c)(1) provides that "such court has jurisdiction under the
law of such State."
Due to the structure of the federal act, the interrelationship be-
tween the continuing jurisdiction of an initial decree court and the
modification power of a subsequent forum has been the subject of
some confusion. 4 This in turn has led to substantial debate as to the
208. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); New
York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
209. H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1101 (3d ed. 1980).
210. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 613 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
211. UCCJA S 14(a), 9 U.L.A. 153-54 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1713(A) (1983)].
212. Subsection 1738A(a) states that a court of a state shall not modify except as
provided in subsection (f); subsection (f) is a virtual duplicate of section 14(a) of the
UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 153-54 (1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1713(A) (1983)].
213. 28 U.S.C. S 1738A(d) (Supp. V 1981).
214. Section 1738A contains a number of subsections. Subsections (c)(1), (c)(2)(A)-(E)
and (d are directed at the initial decree court, in terms of its original and continuing
jurisdiction, while subsection (f) directs its mandates toward the modification court.
These subsections, however, are not mutually exclusive, and there is currently some
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intended construction of the relevant sections of the PKPA2 5 In order
for the PKPA to be viewed as internally consistent, however, it seems
there can be but one interpretation of the new law.
The requirements for modification under the UCCJA contemplate
the forum court's assessment of its own jurisdiction, as well as that
of the initial decree court, at the time the petition for modification
is filed."' This same assessment is required by the PKPA 17 However,
the PKPA requires a further assessment of the possibility of the prior
forum's continuing jurisdiction; if the law of the prior forum gives
it jurisdiction over the dispute and any contestant for the child's
custody remains in that state, modification by any other state is
prohibited.
This analysis is supported by the express exclusion of the man-
datory deference rule from the issue of continuing jurisdiction.218 This
exemption means that a forum which has made a prior child custody
determination will take precedence over potential modification forums
even where the prior forum has become only a significant connection
state. An example of the impact of this provision is Moore v. Moore.2 '9
The initial decree state in this case was New Mexico; the modifying
forum was Louisiana. At the time the petition for modification was
filed, the custodian and child had resided in the latter state for ap-
proximately eight months.
Under the UCCJA analysis, Louisiana was required to find only
that it had jurisdiction, and that New Mexico did not, at the time the
modification action was filed. Because Louisiana was the home state
consternation as to how they fit together to affect the ultimate jurisdictional power
of both the initial and the modifying forums.
215.. According to several commentators, the mandatory deference by "significant
connection courts" to "home state courts" has emasculated the UCCJA's alternative
bases for jurisdiction. The combination of this and the new continuing jurisdiction pro-
viso thus confers exclusive and continuing jurisdiction on the home state, apparently
never to be eroded. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody Decrees-Jurisdiction, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 24, 1981, at 1, col. 1; see also R. CROUCH, supra note 25, at 91. This approach has
been criticized by another commentator, who asserts that the new provision does not
extend the jurisdiction of the rendering court, but rather limits it, by preventing abuse
of the concept of indefinitely continuing jurisdiction. See Coombs, supra note 25.
216. The phraseology of the UCCJA mandates that the modifying forum inquire
whether the prior court "does not now have jurisdiction." UCCJA 5 14, 9 U.L.A. 154
(1968) [LA. R.S. 13:1713 (1983)].
217. 28 U.S.C. S 1738A(f) (Supp. V 1981).
218. Subsection 1738A(d) requires only that subsection (c)(1) of the act be met; the
rule of deference, see supra text accompanying notes 205-07, is contained in subsection
(c)(2).
219. 379 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
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of the child at that time and because the only connection remaining
with New Mexico was the residence of the noncustodian, modifica-
tion arguably was not prohibited.22" The PKPA would change this
analysis by stating that as long as New Mexico law22' would allow
it to assert at least significant connection jurisdiction, and the non-
custodian remained there, all other courts must direct petitions for
modification to New Mexico.
The federal act thus substantially narrows the window of
modifiability, meeting the UCCJA's aspirations for limiting changes
in custody decrees. Congress not only has provided for greater stabili-
ty of decrees and an enhanced likelihood of enforcement, but also has
included potent mechanisms for directing all litigation involving the
same child to a single forum.
CONCLUSION
There is much past experience from interstate custody conflicts
to warrant skepticism about the feasibility of the UCCJA design. For
nearly a half century we have known that courts with almost any
colorable connection with a family unit are unlikely to refuse either
initial or modification jurisdiction in a child custody case.22 A con-
cern in any litigation with interstate elements is that the forum state
may be animated by parochialism, a desire to accept jurisdiction in
order to protect its own domiciliaries against the projected disadvan-
tages of resolution by a foreign state court.22' Even more so, a forum
may be predisposed toward accepting jurisdiction in custody cases
out of a commitment to any vulnerable child for whom its protection
is claimed as parens patriae.224 Consequently, any system of rules
220. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
221. New Mexico has enacted the UCCJA; in the case of Texas and Massachusetts,
presumably the applicable state law would be used as a determinant. See supra note 195.
222. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 1; Stansbury, supra note 94; Stumberg, supra note
1. According to Stansbury, among other connecting factors seized upon by forums to
justify jurisdiction were that it was the child's domicile, that it was the child's place
of actual residence, that it had the physical presence of the child within its boun-
daries, that it had divorce proceedings pending before it and that it had personal jurisdic-
tion over the defending parent.
223. See Ratner, supra note 3, at 391 n.130,
224. Parens patriae originated as a duty and became a power of the English crown
and its courts to "take care of such his subjects, as are legally unable, on account
of mental incapacity . . . to take proper care of themselves and their property." J.
CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 155 (1820); see
generally Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195
(1978). A similar function was recognized in the Code Napoleon and the Louisiana Civil
Code. For a discussion of that development, see Griffith v. Roy, 163 La. 712, 269 So.
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which, like the UCCJA, permits a forum substantial leeway is likely
to be used by states to justify a-finding of jurisdiction to the very
margins of the ambit of discretion. In view of its design, it would
be naive to expect that the UCCJA would be a panacea for the
substantial reduction, much less the elimination, of interstate jurisdic-
tional conflict. Paraphrasing the simile used by Dr. Johnson to describe
women preachers, the UCCJA is like a dog walking on its hind legs;
the miracle is not that it does it well, but that it does it at all. 5
Yet there is growing evidence that the UCCJA is achieving that
remarkable feat. The incidences of assumption of jurisdiction by forums
having only minimal contacts with families and the number of con-
flicting state decrees seem to be diminishing."5 Additionally, in other
adopting states, as judges become more familiar with the Act's pur-
poses and interlocking mechanisms, parochialism and unprincipled
parens patriae rulings occur less frequently.'
History may well record that the chief contribution of the UCCJA
was that it forced a forum to reflect upon potentially competing clairnis
of authority over a custody dispute and to justify its superior interest
before offering a field of combat. If, as a result of that conscious analytical
process, competing forums learn to communicate and to exercise forum
restraint, then the purposes underlying the Act will be achieved as well.
2d 217 (1972). By whatever label, the state's power to protect children is properly
invoked by allegations that a child has been orphaned, deserted, abused or neglected
by his parent. However, when stripped from its doctrinal moorings of state interven-
tion by necessity, such power can be and has been often abused. For further discus-
sion of the abuse of parens patriae in jurisdictional determinations, see Hazard, supra
note 1, at 394 n.56, 395 n.58.
225. Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., in 44 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 132 (1952).
226. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 429 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 153-55; cases cited in Bodenheimer, supra note 25.
227. See generally Rodriguez v. Saucedo, 3 Ark. App. 42, 621 S.W.2d 874 (1981);
Sanders v. Sanders, 1 Ark. App. 216, 615 S.W,2d 375 (1981); Hafer v. Superior Court,
126 Cal. App. 3d 856, 179 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1981); Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. App.
3d 457, 137 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1977); In re Edilson, 637 P.2d 362 (Colo. 1981); Nelson v.
District Court, 186 Colo. 381, 527 P.2d 811 (1974); Brown v. Tan, 395 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Mondy v. Mondy, 395 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Moser
v. Davis, 364 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Grubs v. Ross, 291 Or. 263, 630
P.2d 353 (1981) (overruling Settle v. Settle, 276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976)).
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